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INTRODUCTION
Writing thirty-three years ago in the pages of this
journal, Duncan Kennedy made the troubling claim that the
entire landscape of American Legal Thought was in the
shadow
of
a
“fundamental
contradiction.”1
This
contradiction was an aspect of the political philosophy
associated with thinkers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke,
Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and
John Rawls,2 and it involved the basic problem of relating
individual freedom to a coercive sovereign.3 Liberalism, as
that famous philosophy came to be called, had its origins in
an epic battle against an ancient theory of justice and social
organization, wherein the new believers asserted a kind of
autonomy and subjectivity rooted in an idea about
individualism.4 The foundational liberal move, however, was
to argue that this new individualism, and the freedom and
equality that would come with it, could only be realized
when men were willing to renounce their natural freedoms
in exchange for a regulated and ordered life under a

1. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone‟s Commentaries, 28 BUFF.
L. REV. 205, 213 (1979). Five years later, in a piece co-authored with Peter
Gabel, Kennedy renounced the fundamental contradiction: “First of all, I
renounce the fundamental contradiction. I recant it, and I also recant the whole
idea of individualism and altruism, and the idea of legal consciousness . . . . I
really see the fundamental contradiction these days as a lifeless slogan . . . .”
Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15-16
(1984). Almost thirty years later, my own view is that Kennedy has now
renounced that renunciation.
2. For two “modern classics” in the spirit of the “fundamental contradiction”
and addressing many of these authors, see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY
TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 52-54 (1989);
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 118 (1975).
3. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 213.
4. See, e.g., PIERRE MANENT, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF LIBERALISM 11516 (Rebecca Balinski trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1994) (1987).

2012]

THE MARKET AS A LEGAL CONCEPT

389

collective and coercive power.5 Consequently, here was the
fundamental contradiction: in order to experience a life of
meaningful freedom, we have to give up our “natural”
freedom to a supreme authority of law.6
Kennedy claimed that all law in the western tradition
was dominated by liberalism, and that every legal problem
was in a way a kind of liberal problem.7 Referring to the
liberal contest between individual freedom and state
control, Kennedy stated:
[I]t is not only an aspect, but the very essence of every [legal]
problem. There simply are no legal issues that do not involve
directly the problem of the legitimate content of collective
coercion, since there is by definition no legal problem until
someone has at least imagined that he might invoke the force of
8
the state.

That is, in Kennedy‟s view, all law was liberal, and to
suggest that some law could exist outside of this tradition,
at least in the developed North Atlantic capitalist states,
was to suggest a sort of discourse that we might not even
recognize as operating in the language of law.
Over the last thirty or forty years, “totalizing” claims
about the legal system have come in and out of fashion.9
5. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 211-12. Classic liberal political theorists
have offered varying reasons for how and why freedom would be realized in this
way. Hobbes, for example, believed that in the natural condition of mankind,
human beings possessed an ultimate right of self-preservation subject to no
higher authority. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 66 (Dutton 1965) (1651). That is,
every individual was free to determine for himself just what was necessary for
his own survival, and that such determinations were not moral in any
meaningful sense. The problem, as is well known, was that Hobbes saw this allpowerful natural right as the source of social strife, pushing men into a constant
state of war and fear. Id. at 67. In order to be truly and actually free, Hobbes
argued for a renunciation of that basic natural right of self-preservation in
exchange for the order guaranteed by a political sovereign, i.e., the Leviathan.
Id. at 89-90.
6. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 211-12.
7. Id. at 213.
8. Id.
9. Jacques Derrida is representative:
Thus it has always been thought that the center [of a totalizing
structure], which is by definition unique, constituted that very thing
within a structure which while governing the structure, escapes
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Critical legal studies bloomed, only to struggle against the
onset of rival forms of critical thought,10 and then
apparently shrink in the bright lights of a burgeoning law
and economics movement,11 not to mention the ascendance
of a new and mighty form of legal consciousness: legal
pragmatism.12 Today, a full generation later, Kennedy‟s

structurality. This is why classical thought concerning structure could
say that the center is, paradoxically, within the structure and outside
it. The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center
does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality
has its center elsewhere. The center is not the center.
JACQUES DERRIDA, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human
Sciences, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 278, 279 (Alan Bass, trans., Univ. of
Chicago Press 1978) (1967).
10. Two examples would include developments within critical legal studies
itself, casting skepticism on the notion of the fundamental contradiction, and
later, critical race theory. For a sample of the literature on critical race theory,
see DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM (1993); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (explaining developments,
early and late, in critical race theory); Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of
Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV.
985 (2007) (discussing the role of race in subordination and the history of
colorblindness in law); Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development, and Future
Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV.
329, 330 (2006) (“[C]ritical race theory . . . rises, in part, as a challenge to the
emergence of colorblind ideology in law . . . .”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig,
Celebrating Critical Race Theory at 20, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1497 (2009) (looking
back at twenty years of critical race theory developments).
11. For discussion of the possible fates of critical legal studies, see Richard
Michael Fischl, The Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 779, 782 (1992) (reviewing MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES (1987)) (“My argument here is that this question—not the supposed
failure of [critical legal studies] to answer it, but the assumptions and
structures of thought that are embedded in an revealed by the question itself—
has been a principle cause of a systematic misreading and mischaracterization
of [CLS] work by mainstream legal scholars.”); John Henry Schlegel, CLS
Wasn‟t Killed By a Question, 58 ALA. L. REV. 967, 968 (2007) (arguing that
critical legal studies drifted out of fashion in legal scholarship).
12. For discussions of legal pragmatism, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC
SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW 35-43 (1997)
(advancing the positive and negative uses of pragmatism in legal theory); Justin
Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in
Contemporary Legal Analysis, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565; Catherine Pierce
Wells, Pragmatism, Feminism, and the Problem of Bad Coherence, 93 MICH. L.
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hypothesis seems ripe for renewal. The incredible claims
launched out of law schools in the 1970s about the
connective tissue linking up what were apparently
disparate fields of law has never been refuted, and at the
same time, the harvest borne of this insight has never been
reaped. As we face the onset of yet another wave of what
some economists have called a “Perfect Fiscal Storm,”13 the
time for doubts should be behind us—the time for reaping is
now.
And so, we can ask, time for what exactly? As a
preliminary matter, I don‟t mean to suggest that we
relaunch the particular idea about understanding all law as
a totalizing structure. It seems more fruitful to understand
Kennedy‟s early idea more in terms of style and less in
terms of structure. This means that we should understand
the fundamental contradiction and its implications merely
as symptomatic of a very precise kind of liberal legalism,
and not as an attribute of all possible law. This distinction
between a focus on legal style, and law itself, is crucial if we
are to keep hold of the idea that the particular versions of
market economy we have witnessed over the last halfmillennium are only really just that—versions of a market
economy, and not market economy itself. A market economy
is fundamentally indeterminate, meaning, it may take any
number of alternative institutional formations, and the
dominant styles of liberalism have so far only provided us
with a limited set of those formations. Thus, to restate: we
should understand the analysis of the fundamental
contradiction as an aspect of liberal legalism and only as
one way of doing law, a way of doing law as we have known
it, and not necessarily as an aspect of what it must always
be, or what it might become.
Next, the argument here in the context of markets, and
in a counter-part argument on the subject of race,14 is that
we should train our focus on the idea of legal concepts. That
is, if we seek fundamental market reform, if we seek basic
advances in the battle against racial subordination, the
REV. 1645 (1995) (reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY
(1993)).
13. L. Randall Wray, The Perfect Fiscal Storm, 46 CHALLENGE, Jan.-Feb.
2003, at 55, 55.
14. See Justin Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE &
L. 1 (2012).
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strategy presented here suggests that we focus tactically on
markets and races as legal ideas first, and social, political,
or economic ideas later. There are two arguments for taking
on what appears to be such a juridico-centric task, and
these arguments share a common purpose:
Among the most powerful obstacles in the way of
imagining alternative institutional variations of market
society is the false distinction between free competition and
the regulatory state. This distinction stifles our imaginative
powers because the very notion that naturally free markets
actually exist blinds us from the market‟s socially and
politically contingent legal structure. The transformation of
market society requires an attention to the legal rules that
form that society, and more particularly, an attention to
those background and foreground rules that both constitute
and regulate markets. Our attention to legal concepts must
be historicized so that we are constantly on guard from
making the mistake of believing that anything about those
rules is natural or necessary. In doing so, we protect
ourselves from the common mistake of confusing the
abstract conception of the market with a particular and
contingent set of market institutions.
The two arguments in support of this insight are these.
First is the idea that market reform is substantially blocked
by social contexts—natural forces in the world that exist
independently of our policy decisions. This view of the
relation between social context and responsive regulation
tells us that there is only so much we can do, and that we
simply have to do the best we can with the cards we are
dealt. Competitive markets exist naturally, and our only
recourse is to either manage as expertly as we can, or let
them regulate themselves and hope for the best. This
perspective on the nature of social change can be
challenged, however, when we recall that “social context,” or
“competitive markets” are not naturally occurring at all. In
fact, what we often think of as a naturally evolving context,
say in the case of lending practices or unemployment rates
or whatever, are always historically contingent choices
made by real people in real time. These are choices with
consequences about how wealth and resources are
distributed in society, and there is simply nothing natural
about it. Remembering that the market is a legal concept,
and not a natural entity, assists us when we hope to
challenge settled expectations about what is and what is not
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possible. This might be termed a critical argument in favor
of viewing the market as a legal concept.15
A second argument similarly seeks to denaturalize
thinking about the market through a focus on the notion
that markets are literally sets of legal rules. Just as it is
helpful to shift popular discourse away from an obsession
over “state regulation” of a “free market,” it is also helpful to
shift legal discourse away from an idea that markets exists
independently of laws, and that laws simply respond to
naturally competitive markets out there in the world.
Competitive markets are legal constructs, both constituted
and managed by legal rules, top to bottom. Consequently,
it‟s just plain wrong to think of the legal system as only
responding to the market—the legal system creates the
market just as well. Once we remember that legal concepts
like markets are just sets of rules, jurists are empowered to
manipulate the rules as they like, running the arguments
through whatever modes of legal reasoning seem to suit the
situation, be they formalist, functionalist, or pragmatist. In
other words, the choice to see the market as a legal concept
empowers the jurist to experiment with the form and
substance of that concept in a way that is impossible to do
when it is assumed that the market has an existence
outside of the legal system. This might be termed a
structural argument in favor of viewing the market as a
legal concept.16
15. This argument draws on the sorts of ideas found in BERNARD E.
HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF
NATURAL ORDER (2011); David Kennedy, Address, Challenging Expert Rule: The
Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 5 (2005); John Henry Schlegel,
Essay, On the Many Flavors of Capitalism, or Reflections on Schumpeter‟s
Ghost, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 965, 971 (2008) (“That markets require rule systems
means that there is no such thing as a (rule-)free market. A claim that one
prefers the „free market‟ to a potential regulatory regime is only shorthand for
avoiding the task of explaining why one particular rule system is preferable to
another, for all markets, and thus all capitalist economies, are constructed.”).
16. This argument draws on ideas found in DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED:
THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE (1998) [hereinafter UNGER, DEMOCRACY
REALIZED]; ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FREE TRADE REIMAGINED: THE WORLD
DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE METHOD OF ECONOMICS (2007) [hereinafter UNGER,
FREE TRADE REIMAGINED]; Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980); Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42
SYRACUSE L. REV. 75 (1991); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the
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Taken together, an insistence on thinking critically
about the ideological and historically contingent politics of
“free markets,” and an insistence on thinking structurally
about the sorts of rules that both constitute and regulate
“free markets,” recommends a baseline for institutional
imagination.17 It is for this reason that this Article brings
focus to the idea that markets are legal concepts—that our
descent into what the New York Times has called “a
cataclysmic financial meltdown”18 might be accompanied by
a new round of critical and structural analysis of market
reform.
In the discussion that follows, I suggest that in the
vocabulary of liberal legalism, all legal concepts have two
aspects. The first aspect involves an association with a
particular liberal style, and the second aspect involves an
identification as a certain type of rule. 19 As for liberalism,
Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941,
62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
17. This approach is very much in the spirit of “critical history,” as illustrated
in the work of Thomas McCarthy. A “history of the present,” in contrast to
conventional intellectual histories, seeks to change our self-conceptions through
destabilization of our settled convictions. As McCarthy has explained:
Critical histories make evident that the political values from which
political liberalism seeks to construct a political conception of justice
have always been and still are deeply intricated with matters of power,
desire, and interest, and that they are essentially contestable. More
generally, such histories make us aware that the quite distinct, often
conflicting ideas, principles, values, and norms that have variously
been taken to express the demands of justice cannot adequately be
comprehended, assessed, or rethought without understanding how
elements of the contexts and situations in which they have been
propounded have invariably entered into them.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, RACE, EMPIRE, AND THE IDEA OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 38
(2009). For a similar methodology in a different context, see FERNANDO
HENRIQUE CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA (Marjory Mattingly Urquidi trans., Univ. of California Press 1979)
(1971).
18. Credit Crisis—Bailout Plan (TARP), N.Y. TIMES, TIMES TOPICS (Dec. 7,
2010), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis
/bailout_plan/index.html.
19. In this context, the distinction between rules and standards is irrelevant.
The point is not to say that a concept has to be particularly determinate or not,
or more “substantive” or “procedural”—in fact, this is the sort of dialogue we‟d
expect if we were in the company of Hart‟s work on rules of recognition and the
like. The idea here is more aesthetic—the point is to establish a baseline for

2012]

THE MARKET AS A LEGAL CONCEPT

395

there appear to be four major styles of painting a relation
between market and state, or between free competition and
state regulation. These styles are classic,20 modern,21
neoliberal,22 and pragmatist. As for rules, there are two
ideal types: background and foreground. Background rules
are constitutive of the legal concept, meaning, without those
basic foundational rules, the concept would not exist.
Foreground rules are those rules that are meant to respond
to the play of the background rules. They are regulatory in
nature, and not constitutive of the concept. Each liberal
style has its own particular approach to the relation
between background and foreground rules. Classic
liberalism and neoliberalism share a strong emphasis on
background rules and find few reasons for foreground rules
at all. Modern liberalism has a strong emphasis on
foreground rules, but still retains a commitment to the idea
of background rules. Pragmatist liberalism is like all of
thinking about legal concepts from the point of view of the arguer, and not from
some supposedly neutral and universal statement about the concept itself. This
Article takes notice of but does not move deeply into the literature on
constitutive and regulative rules. For example, the market‟s background rules of
property and contract may very well be “constitutive” in the sense used by
writers like John Ruggie. Following John Searle, Ruggie explains that
regulative rules are rules that take as a given the existence of some prior
activity and seek to control that activity. JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, CONSTRUCTING
THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION 22 (1998).
Traffic rules are examples of regulative rules insofar as the decision to force
drivers on to the right side of the road has little to do with the existence of the
prior and predicate activity of driving. Id. In contrast, the rules of chess are
constitutive in that we cannot know the game of chess—there is no antecedent
activity—without first knowing the rules of the game. Id. As Ruggie says:
“[C]onstitutive rules define the set of practices that make up any particular
consciously organized social activity—that is to say, they specify what counts as
that activity.” Id. In this light, property and contract rules do appear to be
constitutive in Ruggie‟s sense, since we cannot know the nature of liberalism‟s
market game without property and contract rules. In contrast, antitrust laws
cannot be constitutive, since they do, as a matter of definition, respond to an
antecedent activity, namely, the competitive market. For discussion of
constitutive and regulative rules, see JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF
SOCIAL REALITY (1995); Christopher Cherry, Regulative Rules and Constitutive
Rules, 23 PHIL. Q. 301 (1973); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV.
3 (1955).
20. See infra Part I.A.2.
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. See infra Part I.C.
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these styles in that it remains committed to the basic
problem of the market-state dyad, but is unlike the rest in
that it has lost any faith in an a priori assemblage of
background and foreground rules.
What will become apparent in the discussion that
follows is that a choice to emphasize background rules is a
choice that inevitably conjures up the illusion of free
markets. The reason for this is that background rules are
often characterized as hardly rules at all, but instead as
values that are both true and just as a matter of natural
reason, convenience, evolution, or whatever. Because
foreground rules are by definition understood in relation to
background rules, a liberal style that emphasizes
foreground rules inevitably conjures up the illusion of a
heavily interventionist state. The problem, however, is
precisely that these are illusions: the choice between free
markets and interventionist states is a chimerical choice—
the only actual choice is between different sets of rules,
rules that are inevitably laden with political meaning and
distributive consequences.
Part I sets out to describe the classic, modern, and
neoliberal styles of relating “market” to “state.”23 It does so
by taking snapshots in time of representative authors and
locating them in some historical context. The classic liberal
style is represented by John Locke, the modern liberal style
is represented by Henry Carter Adams and Frank Knight,
and the neoliberal style is represented by Friedrich Hayek.
In each case, the purpose is to show how these authors
created a way of dealing with the liberal “fundamental
contradiction” between individual freedom and state control
through the elaboration of background and foreground
rules. I leave pragmatist liberalism for another day.
Part II presents yet another style of approaching the
market-state question, but from a sort of meta-perspective.
While liberals are busy painting a picture of what they
think they see in the world, the critical style elaborated
23. These terms are in quotes here to emphasize the point that I do not mean
to suggest that market or state can or should be understood in trans-historical,
trans-cultural terms. The focus is on the idea of generating a style of market
and state (which necessarily admits that there may be quite a lot of different
styles), not a definition of them. For a classic work in social history, which is not
the style implicated here, see E.P. THOMSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH
WORKING CLASS (Vintage Books 1966).
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here paints a picture about liberals painting pictures.24 It
argues that the distinction between the classic liberal
emphasis on free markets and the modern liberal emphasis
on the regulatory state—the distinction between
competition and control—is illusory. The entrenched
relation between arguments for and against more and less
regulation is important to understand in the work of
outlining liberal programs or styles or sensibilities of
political economy.25 As abstract technique or style, there is a
real difference between the classic liberal focus on free
competition and the modern liberal focus on expert control.
The critical point here, however, is that this difference is
not the difference we usually take it to be: so-called “free
markets” are deeply regulated, and so the alleged
distinctions between more and less regulatory approaches
are largely false. The real difference between the legal
styles of competition and control lies in the choice between
background and foreground rules. Classic liberal and
neoliberal preferences for free markets are merely

24. Just as I have not attempted to provide a comprehensive history of
economic liberalism in Part I, Part II does not outline a unified theory of
critique or an intellectual history of Marxism, the Frankfurt School, American
Legal Realism, Structuralism, or anything else. For examples of such reviews,
see AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993); DAVID
HELD, INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL THEORY: HORKHEIMER TO HABERMAS (1980); 1
THE HISTORY OF MARXISM: MARXISM IN MARX‟S DAY (Eric J. Hobsbawm ed.,
Indiana University Press 1982); MARTIN JAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION: A
HISTORY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH
1923-1950 (1973); EDITH KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF STRUCTURALISM: LEVI-STRAUSS
TO FOUCAULT (1980); ROLF WIGGERSHAUS, THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL (Michael
Robertson trans., The MIT Press 1994) (1980); David Kennedy, Critical Theory,
Structuralism and Contemporary Legal Scholarship, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 209
(1985); Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 13 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
For recent work on how the writings of critics like Max Horkheimer, Theodor
Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault, among others,
journeyed to the United States, see FRANÇOIS CUSSET, FRENCH THEORY: HOW
FOUCAULT, DERRIDA, DELEUZE & CO. TRANSFORMED THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF
THE UNITED STATES (Jeff Fort trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 2008) (2003) and
THOMAS WHEATLAND, THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL IN EXILE (2009).
25. There are obviously a number of streams of critical work that could be
emphasized here, most notably one in line with the writings of Michel Foucault.
See MITCHELL DEAN, GOVERNMENTALITY: POWER AND RULE IN MODERN SOCIETY
133-154 (2d ed. 2010) (analyzing Foucault‟s relationship with liberalism).
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preferences for more background rules—not for no rules.26
What‟s more, background and foreground rules don‟t mean
what they are sometimes taken to mean in the liberal
literature. The rules of property and contract, for example,
don‟t have any naturally specified content—these are legal
concepts that can be re-arranged in multiple ways, and in
each of those ways there are different distributive results.
To make reference to the importance of background rules of
property and contract, in the abstract, is quite literally to
make reference to nothing concrete at all. This critical style
is rather idiosyncratically arranged through a discussion of
sample texts from Karl Marx, Robert Hale, Morris Cohen,
and Duncan Kennedy.
I. LIBERAL LEGALISM: THREE STYLES
A. The Classic Liberal Style: The Law of Competition
If our subject is the relation between market and state,
the style of relating them that was born in seventeenth
century England, and went on to rule the world, is
associated with the set of ideas known as classic
liberalism.27 In the discussion that follows, John Locke will

26. Throughout this Article I mostly refer to property and contract as the
essential rules for both the classic and modern liberal conceptions of market
society. My failure to focus on tort should not be registered as a disagreement.
My decision to leave tort law out of the story is primarily a function of my choice
to use Locke‟s Second Treatise as the revelatory text for classic liberalism. See
infra Part I.A.2. For critical discussions of tort law, see Richard L. Abel, Torts,
in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 16, at 326; Leon
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928);
Leon Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 789 (1930); Morton J.
Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 16, at 360; Duncan Kennedy, Distributive
and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982).
27. Classic liberalism is a topic that has generated a tremendous amount of
scholarship. A sample of works includes KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 2; ALISDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (Univ. of Notre Dame
Press 1981); MANENT, supra note 4; SUSAN MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF ALL
CONSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, DEMOCRACY AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY
(2000); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION: A CRITIQUE OF
LIBERAL THEORY (1985); RAZEEN SALLY, CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: STUDIES IN THEORY AND INTELLECTUAL
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serve as a chief example of how to produce such a style or
sensibility. I will not argue that Locke is either the only or
the best representative of the classic liberal tradition;
simply that he is an effective one.28 The key characteristics
of the presentation will be these: First, there is a separation
between a pre-political economic sphere of activity,
sanctioned by both the natural law of reason as well as
Christian Revelation, and an artificial, political society the
task of which is to guarantee the transformation of certain
natural rights into protected positive rights.29 Second, the
manner in which political society is to generate the
guarantee is through a constitutional government,
sanctifying the natural rights of private property and
freedom of contract.30 Government should not interfere with
the spontaneous play of the market, and must erect strong
constitutional structures preventing political officials from
tampering. Because these natural freedoms actually depend
on that constitutional structure, Locke sets up a separation
between the economic and political, market and
government, natural and artificial, private and public—a
separation that contains the essence of the classic liberal
style.
Before heading directly to Locke, the discussion will
begin with some of the context in which Locke was writing,
a time when the feudal style of political economy was in the
midst of collapse and in which England was witnessing a
Civil War and a Revolution as a testament to that
transformation.31 It is important to emphasize that a
HISTORY (1998); QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM (1998); UNGER,
supra note 2.
28. For discussion of Locke, see C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF
POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953).
29. See infra notes 101-48 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
31. Between 1603 and 1641, England experienced a stretch of peace enabling
a space for the gentry to split over religious and economic questions.
Christopher Hill, A Bourgeois Revolution?, in THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS:
1641, 1688, 1776, at 109, 113 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980). The fracture of the
gentry, along with a Scottish War that proved the inability of King Charles I to
rely on the gentry for financial support, the King‟s insistence on perceptibly
Catholic preferences in a largely Protestant majority, and entrenchment of a
tyrannical style of rule, all made visible the formidable cracks in the Stuart
Monarchy. See id. at 113-14. In 1649, King Charles I lost his head, which in
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summary of the feudal landscape is not intended to
generate a sense of nostalgia for a golden age of communal
love. The burden of human misery in this period has been
well-chronicled,32 and no analysis of the economic context in
which classic liberalism was born should serve a desire to
wind back the clock. What a recollection of feudal economy
can do, however, is place the beginnings of economic
many ways was a good thing for the market: feudal tenures were abolished and
the manorial estate formally became “private ownership.” See id. at 116.
Similarly, the peasantry‟s only real weapon against enclosure—the infamous
star chamber—was eliminated. BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF
DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN WORLD 17 (1966). The defeat of the King made room for rule by a
“committee of landlords.” Id. at 19. “Both the capitalist principle and that of
parliamentary democracy are directly antithetical to the ones they superseded
and in large measure overcame during the Civil War: divinely supported
authority in politics, and production for use rather than for individual profit in
economics.” Id. at 20. As for the Revolution of 1688, it is, in Hobsbawm‟s
opinion, the “turning point” from the dominant hand of the feudal order to a less
visible one. E.J. Hobsbawm, The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, in CRISIS IN
EUROPE: 1560-1660, at 5, 27 (Trevor Aston ed., 1965). This is sensible for several
reasons, including the notion that the Revolution completed what the Civil War
had left unfinished. After a failed attempt to establish an English Republic, the
Stuart Monarchy was restored in 1660 in the person of King Charles II, who
was then succeeded by King James II in 1685.
James proved to invoke the Catholic and traditionalist provocations of his
dead Stuart relatives, and England geared up for a final verdict. Lawrence
Stone, The Results of the English Revolutions of the Seventeenth Century, in
THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS, 1641, 1688, 1776, supra, at 23, 58. To do so, a
handful of English subjects appealed to William of Orange, grandson of Charles
I, husband to Mary (James II‟s daughter), and a staunch Protestant. Robert
Beddard, Introduction: The Protestant Succession to THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1688:
THE ANDREW BROWNING LECTURES, 1988, at 1, 1-2 (Robert Beddard ed., 1991).
The claim of the English was that King James II had reverted to the feudal
approach to property and liberty, invading their individual rights, and they had
no avenues for constraining the King as Parliament had been dissolved. See id.
at 1. Thus, in November 1688, William arrived with an accompaniment of
15,000 men, ready to dispose of the Catholic Problem once and for all. Id. When
it was over, this so-called “bloodless” revolution saw William take the throne,
the entrenchment of a Protestant England, the establishment of England‟s
constitutional monarchy, the passage of the English Bill of Rights, and the
creation of the Bank of England. See STEVEN C.A. PINKUS, 1688: THE FIRST
MODERN REVOLUTION (2009). England was ready for John Locke.
32. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HEILBRONER & WILLIAM MILBERG, THE MAKING OF
ECONOMIC SOCIETY 25 (12th ed. 2008) (“The relation between lord and serf was
often, even usually, exploitative in the extreme.”).
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liberalism in sharp relief, reminding us that many of the
ideas that have been taken to be “natural” were in fact
forged by men in a scene of blood and hunger.
1. The Passing of English Feudalism. By the 1600s,
Europeans were living in the murderous wake of Martin
Luther‟s famous Halloween post on the doors of Wittenburg
Church,33 the impact of John Calvin,34 and the prior
century‟s massive acceleration of power in the Habsburg
attempt to shut down the Reformation.35 Religious war was
the face of the 1600s, probably the most famous of which
was the one commonly known as the Thirty Years War
fought between the Habsburgs, French, Swedes, and
numerous German principalities,36 and ending with the
immortalized Peace of Westphalia in 1648.37 In tandem with
this religious upheaval was the emergence of Enlightened
Rationalism,38 conventionally heaped on the shoulders of

33. DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, REFORMATION: EUROPE‟S HOUSE DIVIDED, 14901700, at 123 (2003).
34. Id. at 237-70 (describing Calvin‟s model for the reformed church and
noting the challenges it engendered).
35. Id. at 270-80 (“It was remarkable that general warfare had been
postponed for so long in the wake of Luther‟s 1517 protest and the gradual
separation of various monarchs, cities and princes from Roman obedience.”). For
discussions of the Habsburg campaign in the context of military history, see
PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF
HISTORY 75-143 (2002); PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT
POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000, at 31-72
(1987).
36. See STÉPHANE BEAULAC, THE POWER OF LANGUAGE IN THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE WORD SOVEREIGNTY IN BODIN AND VATTEL AND THE
MYTH OF WESTPHALIA 75-83 (2004) (describing the power dynamics that set the
stage for the Thirty Years‟ War).
37. See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT‟L L. 20,
21, 24 (1948) (providing a classic treatment of the Thirty Years War).
38. See JACQUES BARZUN, FROM DAWN TO DECADENCE: 500 YEARS OF WESTERN
CULTURAL LIFE (2000) (providing a history of the Enlightenment). For a
fascinating account of the struggle between rationalism and historicism, see
Paulo Barrozo, The Great Alliance: Reason, History, and Will in Modern Law
(Feb. 2012) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file with
author). For general histories, see MACINTYRE, supra note 27 (detailing the
emergence of enlightened rationalism in the context of religious upheaval);
BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (1945) (providing
general histories of Western philosophy).
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Descartes,39 Hobbes,40 Newton,41 or Locke.42 This was the
spirit of an independent and individualistic search for
empirical truth, and the crowning of Man‟s true power over
Nature—the power of Reason.43 Together, the effects of the
Reformation and the Renaissance set the stage for the wild
social climate of the 1600s.44
In terms of material life,45 seventeenth century England
sat in a curious position, not yet at the very beginnings of
market society, and also not yet into the revolutionary
39. RENÈ DESCARTES, Discourse on the Method, in DESCARTES: SELECTED
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 20 (John Cottingham et al. trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1637).
40. HOBBES, supra note 5.
41. ISAAC NEWTON, PHILOSOPHIAE NATURALIS PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA
(Alexandre Koyré & I. Bernard Cohen eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1972) (1687).
42. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1689).

OF

GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,

43. See MAX HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE OF REASON (1947) (providing a critique of
the role of reason in man‟s perceived supremacy over nature); PIERRE SCHLAG,
THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998) (same).
44. Gross, supra note 37, at 28 (describing the Restoration and the
Renaissance as “centrifugal forces” acting to undermine established authority);
Jenny Wormald, Introduction to THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 1, 1 (Jenny
Wormald ed., 2008) (“Of course, history never stands still. But in [the
seventeenth century] it moved at bewildering and sometimes kaleidoscopic
speed.”). The seventeenth century is conventionally understood as a rather short
and chaotic period ranging from the ascension of the Scottish King James I to
the English throne in 1603, and ending in 1688 with the Glorious Revolution.
Id. Conversely, the eighteenth century is viewed as a “long century,” beginning
in 1688 and ending with the termination of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. Id.
The nineteenth century is another “long” one, ending after WWI. For a
wonderful discussion of the long nineteenth century, see E.J. HOBSBAWM, THE
AGE OF REVOLUTION: EUROPE 1789-1848 (1962) [hereinafter HOBSBAWM, AGE OF
REVOLUTION]; ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF CAPITAL, 1848-1875 (Vintage Books
1996) [hereinafter HOBSBAWM, AGE OF CAPITAL]; ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF
EMPIRE, 1875-1914 (1987) [hereinafter HOBSBAWM, AGE OF EMPIRE].
45. Here I follow Fernand Braudel‟s emphasis on the distinction between
material and structural aspects of capitalist history. Braudel likens this
distinction to the several floors of a house, where the ground floor (“material
life”) represents the elementary aspects of day-to-day subsistence. FERNAND
BRAUDEL, 2 CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM: THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE 21 (Siân
Reynolds trans., Collins 1982) (1979); see also FERNAND BRAUDEL, CAPITALISM
AND MATERIAL LIFE: 1400-1800, at ix (Miriam Kochan trans., Weidenfeld and
Nicholson 1973) (1967) (referring to material life as the “ground floor . . . of
history”).
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moments of the eighteenth century.46 As is well known, the
market society that was soon to emerge was preceded by a
style of feudal economics of a very different sort. 47 Feudal
society failed to realize several of the key components that
would come to establish the full-fledged market society,
including the desire for mass production for profit; a
pervasive division of labor among a laboring and owning
class; a massive shift away from agricultural life and
towards industry; a dramatic rise in the extent of local
exchange; a condemnation of the role of intermediaries in
the supply chain as necessarily exploitative; the creation of
wage-based work; the emergence of a market system
independent of social relationships; a transformation in the
ethics of competition; a transformation of land, labor, and
money into commodities offered for sale on the market; and
the creation of a central political authority capable of
heralding such a transformation.48 Though these elements
were hardly in place in the 1600s, Eric Hobsbawm has
suggested that it was in this period that we find the turning
point:
Once the first crack appeared [in the feudal economic system], the
whole unstable structure was bound to totter. It did totter, and in
the subsequent period of economic crisis and social upheaval the
decisive shift from capitalist enterprise adapted to a generally
feudal framework to capitalist enterprise transforming the world
in its own pattern, took place. The Revolution in England was
thus the most dramatic incident in the crisis, and its turning
49
point.

Let us bring focus then, on some of the key aspects of
what Karl Polanyi famously called the “great
transformation” from a society-driven market (the feudal
style) to a market-driven society (the classic liberal style).50
46. Hobsbawm, supra note 31, at 14-15.
47. Id. at 15.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 27.
50. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 72-74 (Beacon Press 2001). Polanyi explained
that a market society “implies a self-regulating system of markets; in slightly
more technical terms, it is an economy directed by market prices and nothing
but market prices.” Id. at 45. This market society requires “[a]ll transactions [to
be] turned into money transactions . . . .” Id. at 44. “The transformation to this
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Feudal economics was based on the relationship between
two primary centers of activity: the manorial estate and the
guild system.51 The manorial estate was the living space of
the lord, often constructed in the form of a castle, as well as
the abutting land.52 The lord was the master of all the very
many individuals that worked on the estate, and by
“master” it is meant that he performed the duties of
“protector, judge, police chief, and administrator . . . .”53 The
lord was due an amount of goods and services from the serfs
and freemen that lived and worked on the estate, and in
return, the lord was obligated to provide his people with a
baseline amount of food reserves in times of difficulty, as
well as physical protection.54 Very little, if any, of these
exchanges took the form of cash payments or had anything
to do with profit, production, or a labor force.55 It was rather
more like a system in which social relationships and their
attendant responsibilities were judged by an objective
normative scheme and determined by individual status.56
system . . . is so complete that it resembles more the metamorphosis of the
caterpillar than any alteration that can be expressed in terms of continuous
growth and development.” Id. And yet, Polanyi‟s purpose was to show:
[T]he entirely unprecedented nature of such a venture in the history of
the race . . . .
. . . In spite of the chorus of academic incantations so persistent in
the nineteenth century, gain and profit made on exchange never before
played an important part in human economy. Though the institution of
the market was fairly common since the later Stone Age, its role was no
more than incidental to economic life.
Id. at 45.
51. HEILBRONER & MILBERG, supra note 32, at 24-28; see also R.H. TAWNEY,
RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM: A HISTORICAL STUDY 189-210 (1926)
(discussing the transition from feudalism to capitalism).
52. HEILBRONER & MILBERG, supra note 32, at 24.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 24-25.
55. Id. at 26.
56. As Henry Maine famously argues regarding the transition from status to
contract:
There are few general propositions concerning the age to which we
belong which seem at first sight likely to be received with readier
concurrence than the assertion that the society of our day is mainly
distinguished from that of preceding generations by the largeness of the
sphere which is occupied in it by Contract. . . . Not many of us are so
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Separate from the manor and situated in the town were the
guilds—hierarchical organizations of craftspeople with the
purpose of producing all the wares not generated by the
manor itself.57 Just like the economic life of the manor, the
guild operated as a social mechanism, strictly regulated by
a set of rules establishing a hierarchy of masters,
journeymen, and apprentices.58 These rules were hardly
restricted to the terms of the trade—they governed the guild
member‟s duties as a member of society, ranging from his
charitable responsibilities to his style of dress.59 Most
importantly for present purposes, the guilds did not
understand themselves to be businesses for profit.60 In fact,
the creation of wealth in feudal times was widely regarded
as sinful.61
In the social network of the manorial estate, guilds, and
the occasional fair, three characteristics were prominent.
One was that land was not understood to be an item for
sale.62 Serfs did not rent their land from the master,
freemen could not sell their plots if they so wished, and
lords were barred from moving their servants off the land. 63
The peasantry lived in strips and plots of land “scattered
unobservant as not to perceive that in innumerable cases where old law
fixed a man‟s social position irreversibly at his birth, modern law allows
him to create it for himself by convention . . . .
HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY
OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 295 (1870).
57. HEILBRONER & MILBERG, supra note 32, at 27.
58. POLANYI, supra note 50, at 73.
59. HEILBRONER & MILBERG, supra note 32, at 28.
60. Id.
61. TAWNEY, supra note 51, at 35 (“It is right for man to seek such wealth as
is necessary for a livelihood in his station. To seek more is not enterprise, but
avarice, and avarice is a deadly sin.”); see also MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT
WORK ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM AND OTHER WRITINGS 106 (Peter
Baehr & Gordon C. Wells eds. & trans., Penguin Books 2002) (1905) (“Wealth as
such is a serious danger, its temptations never cease, and the striving for it is
not only pointless in the face of the overwhelming importance of the kingdom of
God, but is also morally questionable. Calvin, far from seeing the wealth of the
clergy as a hindrance to their effectiveness, saw it as giving them a thoroughly
desirable increase in their prestige, and permitted them to invest their wealth
for profit, although without giving offense.”).
62. HEILBRONER & MILBERG, supra note 32, at 24.
63. Id.
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helter-skelter amid those of his fellows in unfenced or open
fields.”64 Instead, land was understood as a commons,
bestowed by God for all to enjoy.65 Land was not alienable,
was not subject to possession, and so not marketable.66
Second, labor did not function in feudal society in any way
reminiscent of what was to come. Instead of a labor market
in which workers sold their productive functions for a wage,
the relations of master, journeyman, and apprentice were
all regulated by the guild system.67 Individuals had no
opportunity to compete with one another, offering a
particular service for a lesser wage.68 These questions were
social questions, not to be left to the dangerous discretion of
individual caprice.69 Laborers were therefore barred from
putting themselves on the market.70 Third, as has been
noted, feudal society was not a cash system.71 In fact, the
idea that currency could become a commodity itself, and
used for gain through the generation of interest, was
generally condemned.72 As would become clear, prohibiting
the use of money as a commodity played a critical role in
suppressing an expansionist market.73 As a result of these
characteristics, Polanyi famously suggested that in preliberal society, the market was “embedded” in a dense web
64. MOORE, supra note 31, at 12.
65. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION 12 (Paul Negri & Tom Crawford eds., Dover
Publications 2002) (1689) (quoting Psalms to show that God initially gave the
land to mankind in common).
66. See MOORE, supra note 31, at 8 (“They began to treat land more and more
as something that could be bought and sold, used and abused, in a word like
modern capitalist private property.”).
67. HEILBRONER & MILFORD, supra note 32, at 28.
68. See id. at 24-28 (explaining that serfs were tied to the land and required
to provide labor in exchange for security, and that even manufacturers labored
for wages fixed by the guild).
69. POLANYI, supra note 50, at 74.
70. Id. at 73.
71. HEILBRONER & MILFORD, supra note 32, at 26.
72. See TAWNEY, supra note 51, at 39-41 (describing the medieval Church‟s
condemnation of usury).
73. HEILBRONER & MILFORD, supra note 32, at 30-31 (describing the
condemnation of usury in a static economic system in which economic expansion
was not a priority).
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of social practices, traditions, and custom.74 It had no power
of its own to shape social values, as it was never more than
an adjunct, and it is in this sense that we can understand
the feudal style of political economy as a thoroughly
integrated image of politico-economic society.
This is the reverse of the market-driven society (or
“market society”). As the feudal style went out of favor,
land, labor, and money shifted into what Polanyi called
“fictitious commodities.”75 Polanyi noted further that “all
production is for sale on the market and that all incomes
derive from such sales.”76 This means that there is an
assumption that members of the market society act in such
a way as to increase profits through self-interest, and buy
and sell goods at prices generated through competition on
the market. In addition to markets in goods, however, land,
labor, and money also go on the market and produce prices
known respectively as rent, wage, and interest.77 The idea
that all human relationships can become commodities,
produced for sale and consumption, generates a very clear
idea about the relationship between market and society: the
market has been dis-embedded, and is hardly any longer
playing the part of adjunct.78 Another way of saying the

74. POLANYI, supra note 50, at 73.
75. Id. at 71.
76. Id. at 72.
77. See id. at 75 (discussing labor, land, and money as “essential elements of
industry”).
78. See Fred Block, Introduction to KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME, supra
note 50, at xviii, xxiv (“Polanyi does say that the classical economists wanted to
create a society in which the economy had been effectively disembedded, and
they encouraged politicians to pursue this objective. Yet he also insists that they
did not and could not achieve this goal.”). For contemporary uses of Polanyi‟s
concept of embeddedness, see Jens Beckert, The Great Transformation of
Embeddedness: Karl Polanyi and the New Economic Sociology (Max Planck
Institute for the Study of Societies Discussion Paper 07/1, 2007) (“I argue that it
is not the embeddedness of economic action as such that should constitute the
vantage point of economic sociology, but rather . . . coordination problems that
actors face in economic exchange. It is only by starting from these coordination
problems that the necessity of embedding economic action becomes theoretically
comprehensible.”). There is a difference between believing that all human
relationships can be commodified, and the empirical question as to whether all
human relationships are commodified. Clearly, some relationships are protected
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same thing is that the market is now self-regulated. Neither
the manor nor the guild is anymore in a position to control
the dynamics of economic exchange; no longer does custom
and tradition define the color and shape of the market. The
market defines itself, and in so doing, pretends to establish
what was not there before: a separation of an economic from
a political sphere.79
A notable example of this process was the phenomenon
of man-eating sheep.80 Beginning as early as the 1200s, but
not taking full flight until the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, was a shift in attitude towards the land reflected
in what was known as the enclosure movement.81 As
mentioned above, the feudal perspective on the land was
that it was inherently political and social in purpose and
obligation, meaning that the first and best question about
how to use a piece of land was with regard to how it could
contribute to the health of society.82 The idea that the land
could be turned into an income-yielding investment and
subjected to private ownership was bizarre.83 And yet, this
feudal idea did change, and the process of enclosing the
commons that comprised the manorial strip-system was one
of the basic triggers of that change.84

by taboos, like the selling of children, though this might be a bad example, since
the sale of children actually does happen.
79. See RUGGIE, supra note 19.
80. MOORE, supra note 31, at 12. Thomas More described the early stages of
enclosures in Utopia: “[Y]our sheep that were wont to be so meek and tame and
so small eaters, now, as I hear say, be become so great devourers and so wild,
that they eat up and swallow down the very men themselves. They consume,
destroy, and devour whole fields, houses, and cities.” THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 101
(David Harris Sacks ed., Ralph Robynson trans., Bedford/St. Martin‟s 1999)
(1516).
81. HEILBRONER & MILFORD, supra note 32, at 47; see also POLANYI, supra
note 50, at 36-44 (describing the enclosure movement as upsetting the social
order and “breaking down ancient law and custom”); TAWNEY, supra note 51, at
140 (“Against the landlord who enclosed commons, converted arable to pasture,
and rack-rented his tenants, local resentment, unless supported by the
Government, was powerless.”).
82. MOORE, supra note 31, at 8.
83. POLANYI, supra note 50, at 72-73.
84. See Joan Thirsk, The Common Fields, 29 PAST & PRESENT, Dec. 1964, at 3
(describing the process of enclosing the commons).
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By the time of the sixteenth century and beyond, lords
and nobles began resorting to new legal mechanisms in
order to bypass customary law and deprive peasants of their
rights to cultivate the common land so that the space could
be used as arable fields for sheep grazing.85 The decision to
make more room for pasture was stimulated by the fact that
the English wool industry was a lucrative business, and the
lords and their farmers realized that they could maximize
their gains by expanding the available pastures for their
flocks.86 This expansion necessitated an enclosed space,
where the lord‟s animals grazed on the land that had once
been common to the peasantry and the source of their daily
bread.87 Before and during this period, the enclosure process
pushed off the farm something close to nine-tenths of the
estate‟s tenants.88 Polanyi, in his typically colorful language,
described the process as a catastrophe which ripped the old
order asunder, placing in its stead a society of mutilated
relationships.89 The sheep may not have been literally
devouring the commoners, but it appeared that they might
as well have been.
85. MOORE, supra note 31, at 9.
86. HEILBRONER & MILFORD, supra note 32, at 47; see also MOORE, supra note
31, at 10-11 (describing yeoman farmers as economically ambitious capitalists
who were motivated to take every possible opportunity to increase profits).
87. HEILBRONER & MILFORD, supra note 32, at 47.
88. Id. at 48; see also MOORE, supra note 31, at 21 (“[T]he enclosures were the
final blow that destroyed the whole structure of the English peasant society
embodied in the traditional village.”).
89. As Polanyi describes the enclosure movement:
Enclosures have appropriately been called a revolution of the rich
against the poor. The lords and nobles were upsetting the social order,
breaking down ancient law and custom, sometimes by means of
violence, often by pressure and intimidation. They were literally
robbing the poor of their share in the common, tearing down the houses
which, by the hitherto unbreakable force of custom, the poor had long
regarded as theirs and their heirs‟. The fabric of society was being
disrupted; desolate villages and the ruins of human dwellings testified
to the fierceness with which the revolution raged, endangering the
defences of the country, wasting its towns, decimating its population,
turning its overburdened soil into dust, harassing its people and
turning them from decent husbandmen into a mob of beggars and
thieves.
POLANYI, supra note 50, at 37.
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The enclosure movement, which spanned several
hundred years,90 was beginning to have several noticeable
effects. One was the creation of an entirely new class: the
“wandering poor.”91 Pushed off their traditional lands, these
starving peasants would transform into a key ingredient of
a market society, that of a labor force willing to sell their
productive powers for a wage.92 Another effect was the
transformation of land understood as a social device into
private property.93 Along with the emergence of wage-labor
and private property, the operative mechanism that would
unite the individuals of the nascent market society was the
contract device.94 But the effect that was surely more
noticeable to the yeoman and upper gentry doing the
enclosing was the great supply in the yield of the land. 95
Whatever the social dimensions of the transformation, no
one could deny that in terms of maximizing profits, the
enclosure movement was a tremendous advance.96
2. John Locke‟s “Very Natural Doctrine.” Bertrand
Russell has described John Locke as the “apostle of the
Revolution of 1688, the most moderate and the most
successful of all revolutions.”97 Eric Hobsbawm has in turn
described the Revolution as the pivotal moment when the
feudal system gave way to the English market society.98
90. HEILBRONER & MILFORD, supra note 32, at 47.
91. Id. at 48.
92. Id.; see also HOBSBAWM, AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 44, at 149-52
(“[T]he great mass of the rural population had in some way to be transformed, at
least in part, into freely mobile wage-workers for the growing non-agricultural
sector of the economy.”).
93. HEILBRONER & MILFORD, supra note 32, at 47.
94. See Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to
Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 207 (1987) (describing formal contracting as a
means of uniting self-interested individuals in “carefully circumscribed”
interactions); Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal
Fictions, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 53-59 (2011) (describing contracts as embedded
in social context).
95. POLANYI, supra note 50, at 36 (“[T]he yield of the land manifestly
increased . . . .”).
96. Id.; see also HEILBRONER &MILFORD, supra note 32, at 47-48 (noting the
increase in land productivity as a result of enclosure, but describing the
economic growth it brought about as “ruthless” in its effect on the labor force).
97. RUSSELL, supra note 38, at 604.
98. Hobsbawm, supra note 31, at 27.

2012]

THE MARKET AS A LEGAL CONCEPT

411

Locke, as a consequence, was the “most fortunate of all
philosophers. He completed his work in theoretical
philosophy just at the moment when the government of his
country fell into the hands of men who shared his political
opinions.”99
The following discussion will review the “apostle‟s” very
familiar arguments in his Second Treatise, and the
symmetry between Locke‟s theory of property, contract, and
money and the emergence of a market society. It will serve
as chief representative of the market-state dyad in the
classic liberal style, masking the political struggles that
paved the way for the competitive market by cloaking them
in an aura of natural timelessness.100
Locke establishes a strong dichotomy between a prepolitical, natural society in which men freely and equally
engage in commercial relations, and a totally separate
political society in which men will sadly, if necessarily, give
up their total powers and enter the artificial realm of
government and positive law. I will review each side of the
dichotomy in turn, as well as Locke‟s rationale for the need
to create a political society at all.
Let‟s begin with the natural society. Locke starts off
with an analysis of the “state all men are naturally in, and
99. RUSSELL, supra note 38, at 605.
100. Notably, Locke‟s strategy is to reverse the narrative that has been told
here. For Locke, the natural market society antedated the political society of
England, and in ancient times there existed a natural law of private property.
See LOCKE, supra note 65, at 2. It is only in his present day, the late 1600s, that
Locke regrettably identifies contemporary practice:
‟Tis true, in land that is common in England, or any other country
where there is plenty of people under government, who have money and
commerce, no one can enclose or appropriate any part without the
consent of all his fellow-commoners: because this is left common by
compact, i.e., by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. . . .
[W]hereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great common of
the world it was quite otherwise. The law man was under was rather
for appropriating.
Id. at 15. For a discussion of Locke‟s philosophy in the context of emerging
capitalism, see NEAL WOOD, JOHN LOCKE AND AGRARIAN CAPITALISM 31-48 (1984)
(“[A]nything written by Locke between 1668 and 1692 on the nature of society,
the economy, and agriculture must be read, interpreted, and evaluated—if our
understanding of his thought is not to be distorted—within the overarching
context of those economic ideas.”).

412

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and
dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit,
within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking
leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.”101 As a
consequence of this natural freedom, all men naturally have
an equal right to the exercise of that freedom.102 These free
and equal men are found in the state of nature so long as
they live together “according to reason, without a common
superior on earth with authority to judge between them . . .
.”103 If they have no common superior, but disregard Reason,
Locke tells us that men have left the state of nature and
have entered the state of war.104
It is the Rule of Reason which therefore serves as the
measure of Natural Law. It is Reason which commands
Natural Man not to destroy himself, nor to (unless justice so
demands) “harm another in his life, health, liberty, or
possessions.”105 The only compulsion to constrain oneself,
and the only available form of enforcement, however, exists
in the reasoned heart of man himself.106 As the sole judge of
what constitutes “harm,” every man has the right to enforce
the law of nature and punish its offenders in a reasonable
manner.107 Additionally, all men have a right to
compensation for harm done to them—punishment for
wrong-doing is insufficient.108 These two rights of
punishment and compensation function independently, in
that while any man may punish an offense of the natural
law, only the injured man can demand compensation.109 This
flows from the injured man‟s primal right of selfpreservation.110
Locke‟s Natural Man should not be confused for
Neanderthal Man. Natural Man is capable of complex
101. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 2.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 9.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 3.
106. Id. at 3-4.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 5.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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commercial transactions,111 beginning with the right to
formalize the manifestations of his independent will in
contracts.112 This is a natural right, Locke explains, because
“promises and bargains for truck . . . truth and keeping of
faith belong to men as men, and not as members of
society.”113 Crucially, Natural Man also possesses the right
of ownership, first and foremost to his own physical body.114
In making the argument out for private ownership, Locke
sets himself up against both the feudal and Christian ideas
of common ownership.115 While Natural Man was given the
land in common with other Natural Men, Locke explains
that men were given land (in the beginning) so as to use it
“to the best advantage of life and convenience.”116 Or, as
Locke says a few pages on, God did not actually provide the
commons for the use of all men: “He gave it to the use of the
industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to
it), not to the fancy or the covetousness of the quarrelsome
and contentious.”117 This qualification sets up the rest of the
picture.

111. Id. at 22 (“And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men
possessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave them the
opportunity to continue and enlarge them . . . .”); see also JOHN LOCKE, Some
Considerations on the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest, and Raising the
Value of Money (1691), in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 3, 7 (1824) (“[F]or money
being a universal commodity, and as necessary to trade as food is to life, every
body must have it, at what rate they can get it, and unavoidably pay dear, when
it is scarce; and debts, no less than trade, have made borrowing in fashion.”).
112. See MACPHERSON, supra note 28, at 210 (discussing Locke‟s idea of
contract, including the idea that contracts “owe their validity to man‟s natural
reason”).
113. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 7.
114. Id. at 12-13. Interestingly, Locke repeatedly referred to the idea of
individual right of all against all in the state of nature as a very strange
doctrine, id. at 6, but never suggested anything at all odd about the radical
notion of being able to “own” one‟s body.
115. Id. at 12. With regard to the idea of private ownership, Locke continues to
dominate the field in terms of his influence on contemporary scholarship. For
recent discussions, see Symposium, Property and Obligation, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 743 (2009); Symposium, Ownership and Justice, 27 SOC. PHIL. & POL‟Y 1
(2010).
116. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 12.
117. Id. at 15.
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“The fruit or venison which nourishes the wild Indian,
who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common,
must be his, and so his, i.e., a part of him, that another can
no longer have any right to it . . . .”118 The fact that
something nourishes Natural Man does not make it his
property, however. In order to transform something into a
property, Natural Man must appropriate it—that is, he
must pour his labor into the thing.119 There are therefore
two “unquestionable” postulates at work: men own their
bodies, and they own the labor produced from their bodies.120
By the force of a kind of transitive property, when Natural
Man mixes his labor with a piece of land, that land is
inevitably fenced in, and properly his own.121 But just as
soon as Locke sets down this fairly straight-forward idea, he
famously adds a complicating layer. It is not simply that
Natural Man may take ownership of the field which he has
tilled, or the orchard he has cultivated. There is also an
employment relationship immanent in the mechanism, for
as Locke states, “the grass my horse has bit, the turfs my
servant has cut, and the ore I have dug in any place where I
have a right to them in common with others, become my
property without the assignation or consent of anybody.”122
The question pushing the next stage in the argument is
therefore how Natural Man has somehow obtained the labor
power of his servant, a power which just moments before
Locke had explained to be the inherent and natural
belonging of all men.123
Locke tells us that while Natural Man has not yet
become political, he has developed an impressive catalogue
of economic practices.124 In the ancient version of Natural
Man, he was constrained by the natural law in that he was
only able to enclose so much land that he could fruitfully
118. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 12-13.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
123. See MACPHERSON, supra note 28, at 214-20.
124. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 65, at 21-22 (“[H]e also bartered away plums
that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last . . . a whole year . . . .
[H]e would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its colour . . . . And
thus came in the use of money . . . .”).
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use, and that he could not use so much that would keep
other men from having the same opportunities.125 But
Natural Man smartened up, and avoided these problems
with the discovery that the improvement of the land could
never diminish the goods available to mankind—it only
increased them.126 Here, as Locke suggested, one needed to
understand that a single acre of enclosed land benefited the
whole of mankind by ten to a hundred times as that of a
hundred acres in common possession.127 Thus, greed could
not actually bar the hoarding of land, so long as that land
was being put to use.128
As for the problem of spoilage, the emergence of the
market was the solution.129 Natural Man could hoard as
many goods, or enclose as much land as he could, so long as
he was able to fruitfully make use of those possessions, or,
and here was the new development, he could trade those
possessions for cash.130 In the presence of money, spoilage
was no longer a threat, and so the impetus for growth and
gain could proceed against the sole remaining curb in the
natural law: improve your lot so long as you do no harm to
the life and liberty of others.131 But this curb turns out to be
out of place since the rights of appropriation and
improvement did not only have nature‟s imprimatur, they
bore the kiss of revelation as well.132 As Pierre Manent put
125. Id. at 14.
126. Id. at 17.
127. Id.
128. See MACPHERSON, supra note 28, at 212 (“[T]he greater productivity of the
appropriated land more than makes up for the lack of land available for others.
This assumes, of course, that the increase in the whole product will be
distributed to . . . those left without enough land. Locke makes this
assumption.”).
129. See LOCKE, supra note 65, at 22 (“And thus came in the use of money—
some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that, by mutual
consent, men would take in exchange for the truly useful but perishable
supports of life.”).
130. See id.
131. See id. at 17-22 (explaining how the market allows for the transfer of the
fruits of the increased productivity that results from the individual
appropriation of formerly common property).
132. Id. at 16 (“God, by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to
appropriate.”).
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it, in Locke‟s system “[j]ustice is always already realized, as
long as property is guaranteed and protected.”133 Locke‟s
picture of the possessive individual is therefore one which,
in the end, is acquisitively boundless.
The upshot is that Natural Man exists in a Natural
Market, where he and his fellows equally own their persons,
and as a result the labor of their persons. Mixed with that
labor, Natural Man acquires possessions, and after having
consented to a common coin, is able to contract for the
purchase and sale of more possessions. This brings us back
to Natural Man‟s servant, and the lawn he was busy
mowing. In this market system, how did Natural Man come
to own the product of his servant‟s labor? Clearly, given
Locke‟s philosophical rejection of the feudal concept of
status and hierarchy, the answer cannot have been that the
master owned the labor of his servant, as a function of that
ancient relationship.134 Instead, we must assume that the
servant has entered into a modern wage relationship with
the master, selling his labor in exchange for a cash value.135
Indeed, this seems to be precisely what Locke had in mind
when he elaborated the notion that property gains its
particular value from the labor that had gone into it.136
Labor, for Locke, was about value before it was about rights.
Locke was clear that the Natural Market was not a
state of war,137 which forces the question of why it was

133. MANENT, supra note 4, at 46.
134. See LOCKE, supra note 65, at 38 (“[A] freeman makes himself a servant to
another by selling him for a certain time the service he undertakes to do in
exchange for wages he is to receive; and . . . gives the master but a temporary
power over him . . . .”).
135. Id.; see also MACPHERSON, supra note 28, at 213-16 (“We have seen that
[Locke] did attribute to the state of nature a commercial economy, developed to
the point when large estates (of thousands of acres) are privately appropriated
for the production of commodities for profitable sale. Such an economy could
scarcely have been understood by Locke except as implying production by wagelabour.”).
136. See MANENT, supra note 4, at 43 (“Locke insists on this point: it is human
labor, and not nature, that gives things their value.”).
137. See PATEMAN, supra note 27, at 64 (“[T]he Lockean natural condition has
many „inconveniences‟. . . . However, such „inconveniences‟ must not be confused
with the state of war.”).
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necessary to establish a political society at all.138 After all,
Locke‟s version of the state of nature is much more
attractive than Hobbes‟, which actually did describe a state
of war in which men always had a hand on the sword. 139
Ultimately for Locke, the distinction ends up collapsing, and
his picture of the state of nature inevitably turns bleak: in a
society of free and equal men with no common authority
among them, every man will be judge, jury, and executioner
in his own case.140 But men can never be impartial about
their own interests, and so everybody‟s right to enjoy their
possessions will always be threatened.141 In this light, the
Natural Market is actually a place where man lives a life
“full of fears” and laments the fact that his property is “very
unsafe, very unsecure.”142 Thus we have Locke‟s “great and
chief end”143 for establishing a government and political
society: “[T]he preservation of the property of all the
members of that society as far as is possible.”144 Indeed,
Locke goes further, for it is not simply that government has
the protection of property as its key purpose, but that
political society cannot even exist “without having in itself
the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto,
punish the offenses of all those of that society . . . .”145
The force of this shift should not be lost. For Locke, and
the classic liberal style, there is a strong notion of a natural
freedom that consists almost entirely of a right to private

138. See id. at 69 (“To understand why . . . government is needed, reference
has to be made to the conjectural history of the state of nature . . . . It is only at
a certain stage of socio-economic development that a political society . . .
become[s] necessary . . . .”).
139. HOBBES, supra note 5, at 111-12 (explaining that laws are useless unless
executed by men with “a Sword in the hands”).
140. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 38-39.
141. See id. at 57 (“[I]n the state of nature he [is] . . . constantly exposed to the
invasion of others.”); see also id. at 40 (“The end of civil society [is] to avoid and
remedy those inconveniences of the state of nature which necessarily follow
from every man‟s being judge in his own case . . . .”).
142. Id. at 57.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 39.
145. Id.
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ownership.146 But before the creation of political society, this
freedom is constantly under siege.147 Therefore, in order to
establish a “real” and meaningful freedom, Locke
establishes property as a political and positive right in
addition to a natural right. This may at first seem odd,
given Locke‟s insistence that property is a natural, and not
a political, freedom. But he also insists, and more
conclusively, that politics is in fact a pre-requisite for the
true enjoyment of a market society. Thus, while political
society takes the market as a pre-condition, and is
substantively obliged by those private principles, those
principles in turn require the existence of government.148 As
C.B. Macpherson explained:
The wholesale transfer of individual rights was necessary to get
sufficient collective force for the protection of property. . . . In
these circumstances individualism must be, and could safely be,
left to the collective supremacy of the state.
The notion that individualism and “collectivism” are the
opposite ends of a scale along which states . . . can be arranged,
regardless of the stage of social development in which they
appear, is superficial and misleading. Locke‟s individualism, that
of an emerging capitalist society, does not exclude but on the
149
contrary demands the supremacy of the state over the individual.

Locke believed that government had three basic duties.
First, it must establish a positive law that will protect
property allocations and apply equally to all members of
political society, the members of government included. 150
146. See MACPHERSON, supra note 28, at 198 (explaining that there is some
confusion as to whether, in Locke‟s usage, “property” meant “goods” or meant
“life and liberty and estates,” because Locke used both meanings repeatedly).
147. See LOCKE, supra note 65, at 57.
148. See POLANYI, supra note 50, at 44 (explaining that the market, in order to
become a full-fledged system, must shape all of society). But see Karl Marx,
Estranged Labor (1844), reprinted in ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS
OF 1844, at 106, 106 (Dirk J. Struik, ed., Martin Milligan trans., 1971) (“Political
economy starts with the fact of private property, but it does not explain it to
us.”).
149. MACPHERSON, supra note 28, at 256 (emphasis added).
150. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 57; see also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW
MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 75 (1976)
(describing the legal system, in classic liberal style, as a necessary wall
protecting the market from politics).
IN
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Second, government must establish an impartial judiciary
that will rise above the passions of particular
controversies.151 Third, it must enforce the law.152 Beyond
these baseline responsibilities, the government, or the state,
or political society, had no warrant for interfering in the
workings of the market system153—a system enabled by
property and contract rights, and propelled by the invention
of money.154 Or, another way of putting it is that when it
comes to the question of why the state should ever intervene
in the matters of the market, there is always a single
answer: the maintenance and enforcement of natural law
principles.155 This is Locke‟s fundamental rationale for
constitutional government: the provision of limitations on
the power of the legislature to harm individual rights in a
way that was notoriously absent in Hobbes‟ description of
sovereign power.156
The resulting legal scheme of the classic liberal style is
very straight-forward. At the center of human freedom lie
the right of private property and the capacity to
independently and equally buy and sell goods and services.
In order to properly realize these rights in property and
contract, the state is required to promulgate these rights,
151. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 57-58.
152. Id. at 58.
153. Id. at 59.
154. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION
39 (2000) (“[T]ogether [the law of property and contract] form the foundation of
a private law-based system of commerce . . . . Through contract the objects of
property become capital.”).
155. The decision to enter political society does not create new rights on the
part of government, other than those already mentioned (i.e., ascertainable and
enforceable laws adjudicated by an impartial judiciary). See MACPHERSON, supra
note 28, at 218. All rights possessed by the new government are the rights
transferred by Natural Man, which were definitely natural rights predicated on
private ownership. See id. at 256-58. Consequently, the state has no warrant to
override the naturally conceived right to property. See id. at 218.
156. See id. at 256-57 (“Hobbes‟s denial of traditional natural law, and his
failure to provide guarantees for property as against a self-perpetuating
sovereign did not recommend his views to those who thought property the
central social fact.”). Though Locke did not have in mind any particular form of
government as superior to another, it is clear that whatever its form, the
government would need to be limited by a set of principles establishing a private
sphere of rights enjoyment. See id. at 257.
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and protect them not only against private transgressors, but
from the government itself.
Before moving on to modern liberalism, it‟s worth
pausing over the question of whether Locke‟s mercantilism
makes him a poor choice as a representative of the classic
liberal style of relating the growth of markets to the state.157
Mercantilists like Locke believed in the importance of
stockpiling as much bullion as possible, since a stocked war
chest was understood at the time as an indicator of a strong
state.158 But mercantilists were against free trade, and
generally favored the use of stiff protections for domestic
industry, particularly manufacturing industries.159 In
reaction to French mercantilism in particular, Francois
Quesney and the physiocrats emerged as an apparent
corrective in favor of free trade and full competition,160
though the physiocrats too still played favorites in their
thinking about how to generate growth. Though the policy
of laissez-faire is generally associated with this round of
eighteenth century economics, conventional thinking about
“classical economics” really begins with Adam Smith.161
Smith‟s well-known argument in support of the rather
scandalous idea that the national interest could best be
157. For a discussion of mercantilism, see Lars G. Magnusson, Mercantalism,
in A COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 46, 46-59 (Warren J.
Samuels et al. eds., 2003).
158. Locke‟s most explicit discussions of economics are in LOCKE, supra note
111.
159. See STEVEN G. MEDEMA, THE HESITANT HAND: TAMING SELF-INTEREST
11-13 (2009).

IN

THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC IDEAS

160. See LIONEL ROBBINS, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT: THE LSE
LECTURES 95-103 (Steven G. Medema & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1998).
161. As Heilbroner has suggested:
To be sure, Smith did not “discover” the market; others had preceded
him in pointing out how the interaction of self-interest and competition
brought about the provision of society. But Smith was the first to
understand the full philosophy of action which such a conception
demanded, the first to formulate the entire scheme in a wide and
systematic fashion. He was the man who made England, and then the
whole Western World, understand just how the market kept society
together and the first to build an edifice of social order on the
understanding he achieved.
ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIVES, TIMES & IDEAS
OF THE GREAT ECONOMIC THINKERS 56 (rev. ed. 1964).
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served through the promotion of individual interests would
go to work as the essential organizing idea in every phase of
economic thinking that would follow, from utilitarianism to
(the first) institutional economics to the neoclassical
marginal revolution, to Keynesianism and beyond.162 At
bottom, the idea—an idea that today animates the curricula
of elementary economics courses around the country—was
that free competition was the best method for allocating
goods and services, at the right prices and in the right
amounts, to those market actors that valued them the
most.163 A competitive system would achieve socially optimal
results, it was said, if individual actors were able to pursue
their own needs as they understood them. It was through
the law of competition, Smith and his followers taught, that
we might attain the most morally desirable and
economically prosperous form of social organization.164

162. To be sure, I do not mean to imply here that nothing has changed in the
years since Smith‟s idea of the invisible hand gained popular acceptance.
Obviously, much has changed, quite dramatically. As is well-known, the idea
that the promotion of individual self-interest could, all alone, guarantee social
well-being, was an idea that certainly did fall out of favor by the middle of the
twentieth century. However, my point here is that the idea about free
competition itself as a central organizing principle of society never really went
out of favor. As we will see, modern liberals came to see the concept of free
competition as ultimately desirable, but that it required much more
management than had been previously believed. Modern liberals did not believe,
as was put forward from some on the left, that the very concept of free
competition itself was fundamentally problematic—that the basic background
rules themselves were somehow complicit in the problem of social inequality.
Another way of making this point is to revert to the more familiar language of
microeconomics and macroeconomics. The macro perspective of economists like
Harrod, Domar, or Keynes didn‟t do away with the basic assumptions of the
neoclassical marginalists. It was rather that the marginalists didn‟t seem to see
how conditions of uncertainty and equilibria might prove much more socially
problematic than had been otherwise understood. For a discussion of the
possibility of seeing Keynesian economics as doing much more than this,
however, see UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED, supra note 16.
163. This can be seen in the most basic models of demand and supply. See, e.g.,
JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
107-09 (2009).
164. Adam Smith‟s vision of an invisible hand guiding social progress
through the self-interested pursuit of individual preference is among the most
famous of all images in the classic liberal repertoire. Smith first introduced the
idea in The Theory of Moral Sentiments:
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The produce of the soil maintains at all times nearly that number of
inhabitants which it is capable of maintaining. The rich only select
from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little
more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and
rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole
end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom
they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable
desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their
improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the
same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been
made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its
inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it,
advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the
multiplication of the species. When Providence divided the earth among
a few lordly masters, it neither forgot nor abandoned those who seemed
to have been left out in the partition. These last too enjoy their share of
all that it produces. In what constitutes the real happiness of human
life, they are in no respect inferior to those who would seem so much
above them.
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 215-16 (Knud Haakonssen ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1759) (footnote omitted). It is probably more wellknown for its placement in The Wealth of Nations:
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his
own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it
always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing
his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more
effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never
known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public
good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants,
and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it.
2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 29-30 (Edwin Cannan ed., Arlington House 1966) (1776). For an
overview of Smith‟s work, see HEILBRONER, supra note 161, at 38-43 (describing
Smith‟s concern with the market mechanism that ties society together); THE
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT: A READER (Steven G. Medema & Warren J.
Samuels eds., 2003). The image of the invisible hand is also one of the most
famously criticized in the political economy literature. For a standard Marxist
critique, see GEORG LUKÁCS, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN
MARXIST DIALECTICS 47 (Rodney Livingstone trans., MIT Press 1971) (1968). For
a standard welfare critique, see John MAYNARD KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZFAIRE 39-49 (1926). For a contemporary defense, see MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1962) (arguing that unregulated economic
freedom is a necessary condition for political freedom). For a modern critique,
see Joseph Stiglitz, Guided by an Invisible Hand, NEW STATESMAN, Oct. 20,
2008, at 18 (“[F]or over a quarter of a century, we have known that Smith‟s
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Thus, it might seem that Smith or Ricardo or Mill or
some other classical economist might serve as a better
illustration of the classic liberal style than would a
mercantilist like Locke. The reason Locke works so well,
however, lies in Locke‟s own formulation of the law of
competition. In The Second Treatise, Locke isn‟t talking
about supply, demand, equilibria, or the marginal utility of
anything at all, and of course he couldn‟t be since much of
this kind of thinking hadn‟t been thought up yet. So he
couldn‟t have been talking about those sorts of “laws.” But
Locke was talking precisely about the legal requisites for
making markets happen, and Locke adamantly believed
that these legal requisites included the background rules of
property rights and freedom of contract. These laws, for
Locke, comprised what I am here calling the “law of
competition.” The chief end of government, Locke
instructed, was the protection of property and person, and
that protection would be afforded through the rule of law.
To be sure, many of the classical economists also recognized
the importance of law as a background requisite of market
growth.165 To the extent these admissions are far more
peripheral in such works, however, and that law so clearly
serves as a constitutive engine for Locke, we should feel
comfortable in labeling Locke as a powerful representative
of the classic liberal style.
B. The Modern Liberal Style: The Law of Control
The 1870s was a period of intense shifting in the world
of political economy, then beginning its transition to
“economics,” leaving the “political” behind. The new
economic work, which would come to be called neoclassical
and associated with the concept of marginal utility,
understood itself to be much less interested in questions
about national economic growth and more focused on what
were perceived as the more technical questions about the
behavior of individuals and firms in the markets. As a
consequence, microeconomics saw itself as gaining a kind of
intellectual purity and shedding those controversial
questions that proved so vulnerable in the work of Marxist
conclusions do not hold when there is imperfect information—and all markets,
especially financial markets, are characterised by information imperfections.”).
165. MEDEMA supra note 159, at 160-61.
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economics.166 Around the same time, another field of
economic thinking was in the offing, referred to by Herbert
Hovenkamp as “the first great law and economics
movement.”167 Where neoclassical thinkers had gone “pure,”
institutional economists were trained on the political
aspects of capitalism, and often on what were being treated
as “the legal foundations of capitalism.” To be clear,
however, the emergence of marginalism and institutional
economics did not represent a chastening of the classic
liberal image of market and state. On the contrary, by 1870
classic liberalism had crystallized into a controlling ethos
for modern society. In Hobsbawm‟s words:
Never has there been a more overwhelming consensus among
economists or indeed among intelligent politicians and
administrators about the recipe for economic growth: economic
liberalism. The remaining institutional barriers to the free
movement of the factors of production, to free enterprise and to
anything which could conceivably hamper its profitable operation,
168
fell before a world-wide onslaught.

Consequently, we can see this period as one in which the
classic liberal style was in full flower, but also being
subjected to, on the one hand, the rationalizing work of
neoclassical economics, and on the other, to criticism from
non-Marxist progressives working under the banner of
institutional economics (and later, legal realism).
In contrast to all three of these images (classic
liberalism á la Locke, neoclassical economics, and
institutional economics), a new view on the role of the state
in the market was emerging.169 This alternative had a
166. See Peter Groenewegen, English Marginalism: Jevons, Marshall, and
Pigou, in A COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT, supra note 157,
at 246, 246-261. For an interesting discussion of the emergence of law and
economics in this context, see Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A
Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J.L. & ECON.
163, 181 (1983).
167. Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42
STAN. L. REV. 993, 1025 (1990).
168. HOBSBAWM, AGE OF CAPITAL, supra note 44, at 35-36.
169. See generally SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE
STATE (6th prtg. 1978); ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER,
THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL, THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL (1959); JACOB VINER,
ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF ECONOMICS (Douglass A. Irvin ed.,
1991) (discussing the history and emergence of laissez-faire). The concept of

2012]

THE MARKET AS A LEGAL CONCEPT

425

powerful focus on the concept of competition, but a very
different one than the one we have seen in Locke‟s work.170
As a result of massive transformations in social
consciousness, a steady consensus developed about the
widening gap between the rich and poor, and between big
business and the local entrepreneur.171 This was the age of
the great Robber Baron, the Carnegies, the Rockefellers—
an age in which people were increasingly inclined to see
government take a more active role in controlling the excess
of avarice and the “curse of bigness.”172 Opinions were
laissez-faire has generated an enormous amount of legal scholarship. Some
recent and popular work includes DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE
COMMANDING HEIGHTS 13 (2008); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and
Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 293-331 (1985); Stephen A. Siegel,
Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C.
L. REV. 1 (1991); Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons
From the Controversy Over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV.
187, 187-88 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner‟s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873,
873-919 (1987).
170. For treatments of the classical idea of competition, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA
L. REV. 1019, 1021 (1989) (“In both classical law and classical economics,
“competition” . . . was a belief about the role of individual self-determination in
directing the allocation of resources; it was a theory about the limits of state
power to give privileges to one person or class at the expense of others.”); John
T. Nockleby, Two Theories of Competition in The Early 19th Century Labor
Cases, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 452, 454 (1994) (“19th century American common
law courts structured „appropriate‟ or permissible competitive behaviors by
employing common law tort and property doctrines such as interference with
contractual relations, trademarks and tradenames, interference with trade or
„antitrust‟, and conspiracy.”); Rudolph J. Peritz, The “Rule of Reason” in
Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 285,
293 (1989) (“In our terms, the primary strategy of Sherman and others was to
limit market power and thereby to prevent monopoly pricing; their ultimate goal
was to enhance the consumer‟s well-being.”); George J. Stigler, Perfect
Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1, 1 (1957)
(“„Competition‟ entered economics from common discourse, and for long it
connoted only the independent rivalry of two or more persons.”).
171. See generally THE CRY FOR JUSTICE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE LITERATURE OF
SOCIAL PROTEST (Upton Sinclair ed., 1963).
172. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 104-08 (Osmond K. Frankel ed., 1935) (“Regulation is
essential to the preservation and development of competition, just as it is
necessary to the preservation and best development of liberty. . . . For excesses
of competition lead to monopoly, as excesses of liberty lead to absolutism.”).
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steadily shifting towards the view that government needed
to intervene in the market, wrestling the promise of “good”
competition away from those forces proving the competitive
sphere to be so ruinous.173
In the classic liberal style, the dominant conception of
justice was believed to be naturally embodied in the market
itself, and its historically located predicates of property,
contract, and constitutionally limited government. The
modern liberal style, in contrast, had a different view of
justice, one that was to be characterized by a “fair”
distribution of resources among the classes, races, and
sexes. Individual rights other than the economicallyoriented ones would come to hold pride of place, and the
constitution would increasingly be seen as a vacant treatise
when it came to whether the United States was legally
committed to a particular economic creed. It is difficult,
however, to identify the modern liberal style simply by
reversing what we know of classic liberalism. Indeed, the
modern style does not imagine the state to be somehow
superior to the market, that public officials are more moral
than private entrepreneurs, that large corporations are
necessarily malignant, or that competition is not a source of
innovative production. Instead, the rigid distinctions of the
classic style have merely been relaxed, not abolished, and
where it was once believed that justice was carried simply
through the combination of self-interested efforts in the
marketplace, the modern style counters with a purposive
jurisprudence.174 In this style, it does not really matter
173. See id. at 109 (“[W]e have learned that unless there be regulation of
competition, its excesses will lead to the destruction of competition, and
monopoly will take its place.”).
174. By the time the modern liberal style had achieved a commanding role in
the courts, it was assimilated by the courts through the ascent of the legal
process school. According to David Kennedy and William Fisher, “[b]y 1940, the
realist revolt against nineteenth-century orthodoxy was complete.” Introduction
to Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, in THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 209, 209 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006). “Lon
Fuller‟s 1941 article „Consideration and Form‟ mark[ed] the turn both to
routinize—and de-radicalize—Legal Realism, knitting it into a new mainstream
way of thinking about law.” Id. at 210. This new way of thinking eventually
came under the heading of “legal process,” which had a view of law as purposive,
problem-oriented, and as a “policy instrument with a particular institutional
structure.” Introduction to Henry M. Hart, Jr., and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law, in THE CANON OF
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra, at 243, 245. The legal order‟s distributional
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where the line is drawn between the state and market,
public and private, so long as there is an increase in social
welfare. But it is here that we meet the modern style‟s
second claim. Though it doesn‟t matter where the line
between the public and private is drawn, this style is
nevertheless strongly committed to the line itself.175 That is,
while this style is modern, it is also “liberal” in that it
retains the initial commitment to a separation of political
and economic spheres, where the ultimate purpose of
political society is to first protect individual rights, and only
then to work for the social good.
The paradigmatic example of the manner in which
government would come to constrain competition was the
establishment of a federal antitrust law in 1890.176 With this
law and the body of jurisprudence it would spawn, the state
would explicitly work to control the competitive

dimensions were believed to be less important than the procedures which could
settle disputes, and high priority was placed on the identification of particular
institutional competences to deal with specific problems. See id. “The role of law
in the broadest sense is to set, monitor, and enforce the procedural
arrangements determining who does what.” Id. For further discussion of legal
process, see Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American
Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601 (1993) (tracing the evolution of process
thinking); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950‟s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
561 (1988) (providing the intellectual context of the 1950s to explain the
emergence of the “process theory”).
175. Roberto Unger has explained how, over the course of nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, Anglo-American private law merged with particular
market institutions in order to form what was perceived as “the natural and
necessary form of the market economy and, by extension, as the indispensable
support of the market economy, the pure framework of coordination among
market agents.” ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS
BECOME? 24 (1996). Unger goes on to recount how this view:
[R]epresent[ed] the movement of economic history as a convergence,
through discovery, trial, and error, toward the institutional practices
and legal rules that are indeed required by a market economy. The
property regime is the quintessence of this evolutionary achievement.
Political interventions into this institutional order deserve skeptical
resistance because they are likely to be costly, self-defeating, and
subversive of freedom.
Id.
176. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006)).
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marketplace, isolating “good” competition from the “bad.”177
To be completely clear here, I should emphasize that I am
not suggesting that antitrust law was “paradigmatic”
because it was the most effective or exacting kind of
jurisprudence meant to counteract what many perceived to
be the problems with the laissez-faire system. If it was the
most effective or comprehensive attempt we would be after,
it might make more sense to study the rate-regulation
movement of the late nineteenth century, or other more
invasive elements of the New Deal program. However,
insofar as the point here is to build a proper image of the
modern liberal style, what we are after is a set of ideas that
construes itself as dealing with the consequences of laissezfaire, and not its roots.
This point may at first seem too subtle, but there is a
striking difference between the two kinds of approaches.
The first approach, which I label “modern liberal,” refrains
until the end from any critical analysis of those legal rules
which are constitutive of the classic liberal style, and
focuses entirely on the consequences of that style. Thus, the
modern liberal style confronts symptoms with no worry
about causes. The second approach, which might be labeled
“progressive,” is actually concerned with the deeper and
more fundamental causes of social inequality. This might
mean an attack on the classic liberal conception of contract
and property rights themselves. The modern liberal style
does not do this, nor does antitrust law. Antitrust law, even
at its most ambitious, simply responds. It never attempts to
re-create.
1. The Ascent of Trusts and Antitrust. In the last
decades of the nineteenth century, the classic liberal style of
relating the spontaneous self-regulated market to an
artificial, hands-off government was beginning to go out of
fashion.178 To be sure, classic liberalism was still the
controlling image, and would be so until the 1940s. But it is
in the 1870s that historians have noticed the development
of counter-trends, much having to do on the one hand with
the substantial depression of trade in the period from the
1870s to the 1890s,179 and on the other the effects of the
177. See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
178. See YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 169, at 16.
179. See HOBSBAWM, AGE OF EMPIRE, supra note 44, at 34-46; see also W.W.
ROSTOW, THEORISTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM DAVID HUME TO THE PRESENT
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infrastructure put in place by the revolution in
communication
and
transportation
technologies.180
Together, these developments were at least in part
responsible for a new phase in market society where
economic
concentration
joined
with
business
rationalization181—what came to be known as monopoly or
managerial capitalism.182 Though many were uncertain
about the portents of this economic transition, Europeans
and Americans were apiece with regard to a common
sentiment: they didn‟t like it.183
The advent of the combined corporate enterprise, which
evolved into that legal device called a trust,184 had several
implications for the traditional image of the market pattern:
combinations or trusts would advance at the expense of an
abstract idea of perfect competition, big business mergers
would advance at the expense of small business owners,185
and the business entity would gain rights of a measure
153-160 (1990) (“The declining price trend from 1873 to the mid-1890s was the
occasion for extended analysis by virtually all the major pre-1914 and interwar
monetary theorists, including Cassel, Fisher, Giffen, Keynes, Layton, Marshall,
Pierson, Wells, and Wicksell.”).
180. See Hovenkamp, supra note 167, at 997-1000.
181. HOBSBAWM, AGE OF EMPIRE, supra note 44, at 43; see ALFRED D.
CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS 79-80 (1977).
182. For a legal perspective on the shift from classic liberalism to managerial
capitalism, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW:
1870-1960, at 80-90 (1992). For a seminal account from a heterodox economic
perspective, see PAUL A. BARAN AND PAUL M. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL: AN
ESSAY ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER 218-48 (1966).
183. “Those who do not like the actual tendencies of the [classic] system as
they appear to work out when it is tried—and that is virtually everybody—
attack the scientific analysis.” FRANK HYNEMAN KNIGHT, The Ethics of
Competition, in THE ETHICS OF COMPETITION AND OTHER ESSAYS 41, 48
(Transaction Publishers 1997) (1935).
184. For descriptions of the nineteenth century trust, see HORWITZ, supra note
183, at 73-79; Herbert Hovenkamp, Antirust Policy, Federalism, and the Theory
of the Firm: An Historical Perspective, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 75, 79-87 (1990)
(“Although trust arrangements were individually negotiated and each was
different, every late nineteenth century acquisition was organized around one of
three legal models: (1) the stock-transfer trust model; (2) the asset-transfer
combination; (3) the holding company.”).
185. HOBSBAWM, AGE OF EMPIRE, supra note 44, at 44.
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comparable to that of the private individual.186 Further, as
Alfred Chandler has explained, it is here that we see
market actors willing to forego Adam Smith‟s picture of the
invisible hand and its allocation of resources in favor of the
“visible hand” in the new science of business management.187
Although the “market remained the generator of demand
for goods and services . . . modern business enterprise took
over the functions of coordinating flows of goods through
existing processes of production and distribution, and of
allocating funds and personnel for future production and
distribution.”188 These changes, along with the tendency
towards the new form of trusts and syndicates popping up
in the United States and Germany, led Chandler to
conclude that the new economic man, in his acquisition of
certain fundamental responsibilities previously allotted to
the natural market, had simultaneously acquired vast
amounts of power.189
In the United States, concerns about economic
concentration accelerated in the 1880s and 1890s as the
public became more aware and more skeptical of big trusts
like Standard Oil, American Cotton Oil, National Linseed
Oil, National Lead, and the Whiskey and Sugar trusts.190
The issue bubbling to the surface related to a central thread
in the classic style: were the concentration of capital, the
emergence of trusts, and the withering away of the small
businessman the natural and inevitable consequences of
Liberalism, or were these simply pathological and
aberrational developments, due more to cheating than to
problems with the background rules themselves?191
186. HORWITZ, supra note 182, at 74-76. For a controversial and recent
articulation of this idea, see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‟n, 130 S. Ct.
876, 899-903 (2010).
187. CHANDLER, supra note 181, at 1; see also DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION
POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE 122
(1991).
OF

188. CHANDLER, supra note 181, at 1.
189. See id. at 1, 323-32.
190. HORWITZ, supra note 182, at 80-81.
191. This question represents in a way one of the fundamental dividing lines
between classic and modern liberals. It is also the defining question for antitrust
law. For histories of the Sherman Act and its debates, see BRAITHWAITE &
DRAHOS, supra note 154, at 175; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 56-66 (1978) (discussing the legislative intent behind
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The stakes were obviously high. If someone was
persuaded by the former idea, he faced two choices. On the
one hand, a market society based on private property,
freedom of contract, and a common currency apparently did
not lead to an ideal of full and free competition. In such a
case, the idea would then be to simply let go of your
emotional attachment to the competitive society, and
embrace the natural evolution of big business. On the other
hand, if you felt that the trusts were a natural and
inevitable development, you might very well side with Marx
and consider the whole enterprise to be an unfortunate but
inevitable step on the way to something better.192
But then there was also the latter view: trusts were not
natural at all, and were actually the byproducts of cheating
in the market. On this view, an entrepreneur who used his
savvy, honed his skills, and played the game fairly, would
never find himself in a position where his prices were not
the product of a fair and efficient form of production and
distribution. Liberalism did not need to be jettisoned, nor
did trusts necessarily need to be understood as unhealthy.

the Sherman Act, and concluding that the law should be interpreted in terms of
consumer welfare); TONY FREYER, ANTITRUST AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM, 1930-2004
(2006); RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992, at 926 (1996) (discussing the debates of the fiftieth Congress regarding the Sherman
Act, including debates on differing views of free competition and freedom of
contract); Eleanor M. Fox, The Sherman Antitrust Act and the World—Let
Freedom Ring, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 109 (1990) (summarizing views of prominent
early twentieth century Supreme Court Justices on antitrust); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad
Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1026-28 (1988) [hereinafter Hovenkamp,
Regulatory Conflict] (noting diversity of legislative motive underlying the
Sherman Antitrust Act); Herbert Hovenkamp, Essay, The Antitrust Movement
and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 122-27 (1989)
[hereinafter Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement] (noting contemporary
economists‟ belief that the Sherman Act would impede corporate efficiency);
James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 288-300
(1989) (describing congressional debates surrounding passage of the Sherman
Act); Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. Rev.
1, 34-46 (1999) (discussing the relationship between antitrust legislation and
liberty of contract); William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern
Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1, 15-18 (1995) (depicting the Supreme Court‟s
antitrust decisions as relying on the role of markets and government).
192. See infra Part II.
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On this view, the answer was to simply eliminate
unreasonable restraints of trade.
In either case, the notion of a self-regulated sphere of
economic activity was certainly becoming less popular,193 as
suggested in the very influential work of the economist
Henry Carter Adams.194 Writing in 1887, Adams published
his aptly-titled Relation of the State to Industrial Action, an
essay attacking the “evils” of free competition.195 Adams
began by situating himself as part of a new crowd, a crowd
that in large measure defined itself by who was to be
excluded: Herbert Spencer and his unfashionable friends.196
193. See PERITZ, supra note 191, at 17 (“[N]o one denied the importance of
government intervention.”).
194. Henry Carter Adams is usually described as a member of the school of
Institutional Economics. Joseph Dorfman, The Background of Institutional
Economics, in INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: VEBLEN, COMMONS, AND MITCHELL
RECONSIDERED 1, 30 (1963). As a group of left-leaning economists, scholars like
Adams, Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, Richard Ely, Walton Hamilton,
Gardiner Means, and Robert Hale found themselves in opposition both to
laissez-faire economists and those associated with the burgeoning welfare school
of neoclassical economists. See HORWITZ, supra note 183, at 195. For a
description of the institutionalists in the context of “law and economics,” see
Hovenkamp, supra note 167, at 997-1000; Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase,
Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499, 52129 (2011). For a less charitable, though entertaining view on the relationship
between the institutionalists and the Chicago School, see Edmund W. Kitch, The
Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, in
THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS 53, 5865 (Francesco Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005). Despite Adams‟ affiliation
with a “critical” tradition, I use him here in an exposition of the modern liberal
style since his critique of laissez-faire is a critique that moderns had accepted as
well.
195. Henry Carter Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, 1 PUB.
AM. ECON. ASS‟N 7, 34 (1887). Importantly, however, for those deploying the
interventionist style, it is the idea of a secondary, or derivative form of
competition, that is under attack, and not the legal predicates upon which it
depends. A critical focus on the primary legal requisites of competitive society is
one way of distinguishing the modern liberals from their rivals on the left.
Adams was clear about this in a way that modern liberals were not, as when he
identified the four “legal facts” upon which modern industrial society was built:
“Private property in land, private property in labor, private property in capital,
and the right of contract for all alike.” Id. at 35. It is for this reason and others
that I do not call Adams a “modern liberal,” but only use part of his essay to
reflect what would become a popular attack on the classic style.
196. Id. at 11.
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Laissez-faire, Adams explained, had turned out to be a lot of
nonsense, and as a result there was a “growing clamor for
more government.”197 And why was it nonsense? Laissezfaire involved a syllogism, which, upon reflection, suffered
from a non-sequitur. Its first premise was that all human
interests were the same.198 Its second premise was that each
man knows his own interest, and left to himself, will follow
it.199 The conclusion was that the best form of social relation
will always emerge from the unregulated play of the
market.200 Adams believed that the kinds of interest at work
in the first premise (the fundamental or ultimate interests
of man) are of a categorically different kind than the
interests at work in the second premise (the short-term
interest which might guide a person to sacrifice a
supposedly higher interest for a desire for some immediate
satisfaction).201 The upshot was that the classic liberal style
would doggedly produce a society in which short-term
advantage always trumped hopes for deeper, social goods.
For Adams, and apparently everybody else, the logic of this
disparity was on vivid display.
The way forward, however, was not simply to modify
the old style by shifting the rhetoric from one of a
“principled” view of the self-regulated market towards a
“rebuttable presumption” that the state should keep its
hands off. What was needed instead, Adams explained, was
to seek out laws which would simultaneously “maintain the
beneficent results of competitive action while guarding
society from the evil consequences of unrestrained
competition.”202 There should not be a presumption working
for or against state intervention in the market. The
presumption, instead, should focus on the health of the
social organism, regardless of the relation between the
economic and political spheres, and a realistic
understanding of what market competition empirically

197. Id. at 12.
198. Id. at 17.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 20.
201. Id. at 20-21.
202. Id. at 35.
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entailed.203 Ultimately, the age in which the state was
viewed with a severe case of myopic disdain had come to an
end: “The advocates of non-interference have treated
government as the old physicians were accustomed to treat
their patients. Was a man hot he was bled; was he cold he
was bled; was he faint he was bled, was he flushed he was
bled; until fortunately for him he passed beyond the reach of
leach and lance. This has been, figuratively speaking, the
form of treatment adopted by the people of the United
States for their local governments, and it has worked its
natural result of feebleness and disintegration.”204
Three years later, the Sherman Antitrust Act was
adopted.205 Much of Adams‟ discussion with regard to the
new manner of conceiving competition (no longer
understood as Revelation but deployed with an eye towards
its positive and negative effects) found its way into the
Senate debates.206 Although the initial bill was focused on
the notion of competition, what emerged was instead a bit of
language familiar to the common law.207 The first bill sought
to eliminate “all arrangements, contracts, agreements,
203. Id. Adams did not believe, however, that social health should be left to a
vulgar consequentialism. Sharing Hayek‟s hostility towards the ad hoc use of a
“rule of reason,” see FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72-79 (1944),
Adams believed that the evils of unrestrained competition must be addressed in
a principled manner. To do so, a progressive program must (1) battle the
tendency for the worst of the human spirit to dominate the marketplace, which
tends to place itself as the model of entrepreneurial success; (2) elaborate a full
theory of the benefits of monopolized industry in order to balance out the
dominant model of the competitive society; (3) counteract the corruptive
influence of the notion that government action is innately corrupt and
ineffective. Adams, supra note 195, at 38.
204. Id. at 65-66.
205. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
206. See PERITZ, supra note 191, at 13-26. Peritz explains how these two views
of trusts shaped the debates on the Senate floor over whether the Antitrust Act
should be focused on competition, or restraints of trade. Id. at 14-20. William
Page has set out a slightly different dyadic structure for understanding the
debates. For Page, the real contest was between laissez-faire and collectivism (a
contest that ended in compromise), which stands in contrast to the contest
Peritz has suggested—a fight between two camps, both of which understood
themselves to be at odds with both laissez-faire and collectivism. William H.
Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1,
23 (1991).
207. See PERITZ, supra note 191, at 13-26.
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trusts, or combinations . . . made with a view, or which tend
to prevent full and free competition . . . or which tend to
advance the cost to the consumer . . . .”208 What emerged as
the law instead was a prohibition on restraints of trade and
monopolies.209
As Rudolph Peritz has suggested, the decision to use the
common law language instead of the wording focused on
“full and free competition” had serious implications.210 For
the sponsors of the original bill, what was eating away at
society was the deranged phenomenon of the trust.211 It was
pathological and a threat to the classic liberal style of
imagining a natural market.212 The “ought” to be derived
from the “is” was therefore a frontal assault on those
elements
hindering
free
competition—competition
understood as a principled and absolute good.213 But for the
208. Id. at 13 (quoting H.R. DOC. NO. 124 (1888)).
209. The critical text of the Sherman Antitrust Act is famously brief:
§1: Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000
if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment
not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
§2: Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a
corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2.
210. See PERITZ, supra note 191, at 13-26.
211. Id. at 14-15.
212. Id. at 21-22.
213. Id. at 13-26.
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victors in the Senate debate, it wasn‟t at all clear that
competition was always good, and so the existence of certain
conglomerates might not necessarily present evidence of a
pathology as much as a natural evolution.214 Of course, that
evolution required more state intervention than the market
had needed in the past, thus necessitating the new law.215
The result was a resort to the common law, and the implied
belief that, for the most part, the traditional mechanisms
for upholding and maintaining the market were still
working.216
The twists in the Sherman Act‟s birth story force us to
ask whether the new statute was really more of apiece with
classic or modern liberalism. On the one hand, the Senate‟s
resort to the common law suggested a final refusal to
believe the market had really and truly gone astray.217
Surely, new means of enforcement were needed, and courts
would be empowered with them under the Sherman Act, but
as to whether the laissez-faire system was intrinsically
corrosive, the Senate declined to take such a strong view.218
On the other hand, despite the Senate‟s reticence, the first
years of antitrust jurisprudence were marked with a
“literal” quality foreign to the common law, in which courts
took very seriously the Sherman Act‟s prohibition on all
unreasonable restraints of trade.219 Thus, while the

214. See PERITZ, supra note 192, at 24-25. The notion of evolution plays an
interesting role in all of these debates. On the one hand, German historicism
was influential on progressive scholarship. See Hovenkamp, The Antitrust
Movement, supra note 191, at 109-18. On the other, a more Darwinian argument
animates neoclassical ideas about the common law, most notably in F.A.
Hayek‟s understanding of the Rule of Law. See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 228 (1960) (“A free system can adapt itself to almost
any set of data, almost any general prohibition or regulation, so long as the
adjusting mechanism itself is kept functioning.”). A conservative historicism is
also on display in liberal philosophy, as with David Hume, Edmund Burke, and
Michael Oakeshott. For a discussion, see Barrozo, supra note 38.
215. See PERITZ, supra note 191, at 24.
216. See id. at 21. Of course, the remedies found in the statute were radical,
and totally alien to the common law. See id. at 25-26.
217. See id. at 20-26.
218. See id.
219. See Peritz, supra note 170, at 313.
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language was old, the interpretation was new, and more in
line with the popular distaste for the new trusts.220
2. “The Ethics of Competition.” As lawyers and judges
struggled in the following decades to come up with a concept
of competition that made sense out of the Sherman Act,221
economists were similarly at work dealing with the
prospects of “market failure.”222 As W.W. Rostow has
described the beginnings of a shift occurring around 1870
from classical to welfare economics, the central moves would
eventually involve a “shift from a focus on growth to social
reform and welfare; a new emphasis on the refinement of
analysis; a heightened concern with the optimum allocation
of resources, in terms of marginal analysis; and the
emergence of economics throughout the Atlantic world as an
academic profession.”223 Among the new economists was
Frank Knight,224 who in time would become known as
220. After 1911, this progressive or populist streak in antitrust jurisprudence
took a classical turn in the famous Standard Oil decision. See id. at 329-36
(discussing the debates between the “literalists” and the “Rule of Reason”
faction).
221. For discussion of the early years of antitrust jurisprudence, before the
“Rule of Reason” came down in Standard Oil, see James May, Antitrust Practice
and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach
of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1981, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495, 541-53 (1987)
(discussing the vagueness of Supreme Court decisions in early antitrust
jurisprudence) and Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990
DUKE L.J. 263, 269-78 (presenting a “counter-history” of the evolution of
antitrust law consisting of “a correspondence of struggles between factions
holding two radically opposed views of competition policy”).
222. For treatments of the relation between changes in legal thought and the
change from classical to neoclassical economics, see MEDEMA, supra note 159, at
26-53; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process,
40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 407-09 (1988); Kennedy, supra note 26, at 596-614.
223. ROSTOW, supra note 179, at 153.
224. See RAZEEN SALLY, CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 6780 (1998) (discussing Frank Knight‟s political economy). I do not mean to make
any claims that Frank Knight, or Henry Carter Adams for that matter, “was” a
modern liberal. My claim is rather that when certain of their texts are examined
for a critique of laissez-faire, we see a central tenet of the modern liberal style.
Some might still be surprised by my use of Knight as an illustration of the style
of political economy known for its acceptance of social planning, and even more,
some might be revolted by my juxtaposition of Knight with Adams. To be fair, it
is true that Knight is “a lodestar” in the neoliberal constellation, having
mentored such stars as Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Aaron Director, and
Hayek. Id. at 67. At the same time, Adams is a poster-child for leftist
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among the founders of the price theoretic tradition
associated with the “Chicago School.”225
Although Knight is widely known as a strong supporter
of the market, and is sometimes called a “classic liberal,”226
in 1935 Knight grappled with contemporary views
regarding the costs of free competition in his The Ethics of
Competition.227 As so many writers of this period tended to
do, Knight framed the essay by noticing “the contrast
between the enticing plausibility of the case for the „obvious
and simple system of natural liberty,‟ and the notoriously
disappointing character of the results which it has tended to
bring about in practice.”228 These “intolerable” results
brought on at an accelerating pace a new way of thinking
about government “interference” in the market, an
acceleration
that
for
Knight
was
completely
understandable, though not necessarily welcome.229 As
Knight would demonstrate, the idea of “competition” was
deeply flawed, but he remained agnostic as to whether there
was any better alternative.230 The way forward lay in the
murky problem of finding “the right proportions between
individualism and socialism.”231
As a point of departure, Knight explained that the
classic view of competition was premised on the idea that:
economists, and was a member of that most hated group of Institutionalists,
sworn enemies of Chicagoans everywhere. See supra note 176 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, the use of Adams and Knight (neither of
which could be labeled as a modern liberal when understood in the broader
context of their work) in piecing together what I am calling the modern liberal
style is helpful in making the case that welfarism was not necessarily tied to
any particular view of partisan politics.
225. SALLY, supra note 224, at 67.
226. Id. at 68.
227. KNIGHT, supra note 183, at 41-75. Despite his complaints, Knight was no
social planner, and an ardent opponent of the New Deal. See FRANK HYNEMAN
KNIGHT, Economic Theory and Nationalism, in THE ETHICS OF COMPETITION AND
OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 183, at 277, 293-94 (referring to the New Deal as a
form of “socialism” whose supporters were “comfortably vague” as to how to
enact their goals).
228. KNIGHT, supra note 183, at 47.
229. Id. at 48.
230. Id. at 44.
231. Id. at 58.
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[A] freely competitive organization of society tends to place every
productive resource in that position in the productive system
where it can make the greatest possible addition to the total social
dividend as measured in price terms, and tends to reward every
participant in production by giving it the increase in the social
232
dividend which its co-operation makes possible.

Knight did not believe that this view was inaccurate, and
suggested that those who criticized it were confusing
economic arguments with ethical ones.233 We might not like
the tendencies of the competitive market, Knight suggested,
but this implicates an ethical ideal, and not an analysis of
the competitive mechanism itself.234
Nevertheless, Knight was sympathetic to an ethical
outlook, and first outlined a series of objections with respect
to how the ideal of free competition failed to match up to
material life.235 Among these was the argument that
whereas the competitive system assumes a society of “freely
contracting individuals,” the practical unit in production
and consumption was the family.236 Families, not
individuals, were the basic building blocks of society, and
individuals without social relationships, or somehow
defined as something other than the cultural products that
they really are, could not be understood as real individuals
at all.237
Another argument concerned the notion of fictitious
commodities, though Knight didn‟t put it in those words. It
was “universally recognized that effective competition calls
for” the placing of all goods and services “into exchange,”
and yet it was clear that this assumption barely fit the facts
of real social life238—a life in which labor and land could
232. Id. at 48. If we accept Hovenkamp‟s view of competition, Knight is likely
reading into Adam Smith an idea about competition which really didn‟t emerge
until neoclassical economics took hold. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman
Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019, 1025-29
(1988).
233. KNIGHT, supra note 183, at 48.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 49.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 50.
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never be actually believed to have been produced for sale.
Knight also criticized the assumption that members of
competitive society are rational, have perfect knowledge,
understand what it is that they purchase, or why they even
make the purchases that they do.239 The classic image of
competition similarly failed to capture the wide-ranging
tasks of government with regard to the regulation of
currency and credit.240 The bottom line was that while the
theoretical tendencies of the competitive system might be
persuasive, its practical and fundamental limitations cause
the system to fall “enormously” short of “our highest
ideals.”241
Knight then moved towards a bigger picture question:
given these discrepancies between the image of the freely
competitive society and the reality of our own, why do we
keep on competing?242 What does the competitive system
have going for it?243 As for the first question, Knight
wondered whether the idea of “business as game” might
make the concept of economic competition more
comprehensible. His conclusion was that it did not.244 For
one thing, players need incentives to play, and for a small
number of “captains of industry,” the game was certainly
quite enticing.245 But for most of the people living in a social
order where all values have been reduced to a measure of
money, the compulsion to play can be agony: the
“propertyless and ill-paid masses” protest not only the
specter of endless impoverishment, but also “the terms of
what they feel to be an unfair contest in which being
defeated by the stacking of the cards against them is
perhaps as important to their feelings as the physical
significance of the stakes which they lose.”246

239. Id. at 50-51.
240. See id. at 53.
241. Id. at 57.
242. See id. at 58-66.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 64-66.
245. Id. at 61.
246. Id. at 60.
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Thinking about business as a game also highlighted the
disjuncture between efficiency and equality.247 The
competitive mechanism, for example, allocates resources to
those who use them most efficiently, not to those who might
have the greatest need for those resources.248 This is akin to
giving the fastest runner the shortest track—a consequence
of perfect economic sense, but one in basic conflict with the
idea that the slower runner should have been given a head
start.249 What this makes for is actually a really lousy game:
[The outcome of the business game] is a very inaccurate test of
real ability, for the terms on which different individuals enter the
contest are too unequal. The luck element moreover is so large—
far larger than fairly successful participants in the game will ever
admit—that capacity and effort may count for nothing. And this
luck element works cumulatively, as in gambling games
250
generally.

Another problem is that:
[D]ifferences in the capacity to play the business game are
inordinately great from one person to another. But as the game is
organized, the weak contestants are thrown into competition with
the strong in one grand mêlée; there is no classification of the
participants or distribution of handicaps such as is always
recognized to be necessary to sportsmanship where unevenly
251
matched contestants are to meet.

But it gets worse. In the real world, there actually are
handicaps, but they affect the wrong players, providing
“advantage to the strong rather than the weak. We must
believe that business ability is to some extent hereditary,
and social institutions add to inherited personal superiority
the advantages of superior training preferred conditions of
entrance into the game, and even an advance distribution of
the prize money.”252

247. See id. at 61.
248. Id. at 61-62.
249. Id. at 62.
250. Id. at 64.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 64-65.

442

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

Alright, so as far as good sport goes, big business is a
lousy competition.253 But, asks Knight, is there anything
morally redeemable about playing the game?254 What
competitive society seems to have going for it is that, in
terms of the 100 meter dash, an efficiency norm will
establish that the fastest person runs the race with the best
training and with the best resources. Competition will
ensure that the fastest time is put in the record books. The
knack for “getting things done,” however, doesn‟t lead to an
obvious answer as to whether having the fastest time
recorded was the most morally desirable result.255 Indeed,
Knight emphasizes, it is at least plausible that it would be
more socially desirable for more people to be less hungry,
than for society to have produced an incredibly fast
runner.256 Of course, the answer to this question turns on
the value set we choose to favor, and for Knight,
highlighting this fact was the whole point.257
Four years after Knight published The Ethics of
Competition, the case against laissez-faire deepened. On
October 29, 1929, the stock market took its famous crash,
and within a few weeks the American economy had
hemorrhaged $30 billion.258 In the few years that followed,
national gross domestic product fell by half, one out of four
people was out of work, nine million savings accounts went
up in smoke, and workers were regularly forced to graze or
steal if they were to survive.259 The causes of the crash and
the depression that followed, such as the massive stock
speculation and shocking distributional allocations of the
prior decade,260 are not as relevant for us as is the response

253. See id. at 61-65.
254. See id. at 66-75.
255. Id. at 74.
256. See id. at 66-75.
257. See id. at 68-69.
258. HEILBRONER & MILBERG, supra note 32, at 100.
259. Id. at 100-01.
260. Id. at 101, 105-06; see also ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES: A
HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1914-1991, at 100 (1994) (“[A]s mass demand could not
keep pace with the rapidly increasing productivity of the industrial system in
the heyday of Henry Ford, the result was over-production and speculation. This,
in turn, triggered the collapse.”). See generally W.W. ROSTROW, Explanations of
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that followed. According to Robert Heilbroner and William
Milberg, that response, so important to the identity of the
modern liberal style, laid the foundation for “a new pattern
of government relationship to the private economy, a
pattern that was to spell a major change in the organization
of American capitalism . . . . [A] change marked by an
unprecedented enlargement of the range and reach of
governmental powers within the market system.”261 It is
therefore fair to say that the opposition to classic liberalism,
which began to crawl out from the periphery, had made its
way into the very center of the mainstream by the 1930s
and „40s.262 The new, “middle” way between classic
liberalism and socialism had been found at last, and its hero
would be John Maynard Keynes.263

the Great Depression, in BRITISH ECONOMY
(1948).

OF THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY 145

261. HEILBRONER & MILBERG, supra note 32, at 111.
262. See PERITZ, supra note 191, at 111-15.
263. In mapping out the grand styles of classic and modern approaches to
political economy, one might easily expect an exposition of John Maynard
Keynes‟ General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. There can be no
doubt that this text, along with Keynes‟ other writings, had an immense
influence on postwar economic policy around the world. For Keynes, as for so
many of the theorists of the first half of the twentieth century, modern life
demanded a new, middle way between individualism and socialism, a way that
would secure full employment of national resources, provide equitable
distribution of incomes, and planned governmental intervention in the market.
See, e.g., DONALD MARKWELL, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 140-209 (2006) (discussing Keynes‟ evolution in thought toward a
“middle way” economic theory). This middle way was what Keynes called “New
Liberalism.” Id. I have forgone the use of Keynes as an express demonstration of
the modern liberal style, however, in hopes of dislodging any particular
presumptions about “Keynesianism” from the non-partisan approach I have
attempted to elucidate here. As mentioned above, finding pieces of modern
Liberalism in key texts from the right (Knight) and the left (Adams) seemed like
a more useful way of establishing the artistic relationship between the classic
and modern views. For similar efforts to construct “a middle way” out of
apparently contradictory positions, see David Kennedy, The International Style
in Postwar Law and Policy, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 7, 9-13.
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C. The Neoliberal Style: The Law of Competition Revisited
The neoliberal vision of the market264 did not arrive in
1980, fully formed.265 Since at least 1944 and the publication
of Friedrich Hayek‟s The Road to Serfdom,266 classic liberals
had been hard at work, planning an intervention against
the New Deal. Writing at the end of World War II, Hayek
gloomily observed the ascendance of Keynesianism,
knowing that it was simply the precursor to
totalitarianism.267 Having witnessed the transformation of
the German Weimar Republic into a fascist state,268 the slide
from welfarism and social planning towards corporatism
and horror was no mere abstraction. As a result, Hayek
launched a campaign he hoped would force instead a return
to “the abandoned road.”269 This was the road of
264. See JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, at xvii (3d ed. 2009) (“Briefly put, [the „Washington Consensus‟]
was the encapsulation of mainstream development thinking in the early 1990s.
What poor nations needed, it was argued, was . . . better organization. Better
organization was something of a code word that meant, primarily, shifting
resources away from the state sector into areas assumed to be of much higher
value in the private sector.”).
265. See id. at 203-34.
266. HAYEK, supra note 203. Hayek‟s influence has been tremendous. See
BRUCE CALDWELL, HAYEK‟S CHALLENGE: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY OF F.A.
HAYEK (2004). One illustration of his continuing impact is New York University
Law School‟s decision to establish a journal inspired by his work. See
Introduction, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1 (2005) (“This journal‟s name was
inspired by Hayek‟s Law, Legislation & Liberty, so it is fitting that the
inaugural issue should explore Hayek‟s influence on legal scholarship.”). Among
the most well-known legal scholars working in the Hayekian tradition is
Richard Epstein. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, Introduction to SKEPTICISM AND
FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 1, 1-12 (2003) (“My version
of classical liberalism sees a large place for the operation of voluntary markets
under legal protection. Yet at the same time, it is clear that markets do not
operate in a void, but . . . also depend on a social infrastructure that often only
the state can create.”). For a recent discussion of Hayek, and the possibility of a
Hayekian connection to new and experimental forms of regulation, see Amy J.
Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on Reason and Rules,
Organization and Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 357.
267. See HAYEK, supra note 203, at 56-57 (differentiating collectivism from
liberalism in that it “refuses to recognize autonomous spheres” and is
“totalitarian in the true sense of this new word”).
268. See id. at 3, 68.
269. Id. at 10-23.
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“individualism”: “the respect for the individual man qua
man, that is, the recognition of his own views and tastes as
supreme in his own sphere, however narrowly that may be
circumscribed, and the belief that it is desirable that men
should develop their own individual gifts and bents.”270 The
shift from the feudal order, described above, to a liberal
world in which men could equally and freely determine
their life-stories, Hayek explained, had not been so much of
a political revolution as it had been an economic one.271 But
this economic revolution had not been planned; to the
contrary, over several centuries it was gradually understood
that it was in the natural and spontaneous interactions of
men that a complex economic order had been established.272
Hayek did not mean to convey, however, that the
spontaneous organization of economic activity would lash
society to an evolutionary historicism, or a “wooden” laissezfaire.273 The key to economic progress was the liberation of
individual energies and the resulting spark of competitive
innovation, but while this did mean that society should
resort as little as possible to coercive measures, it did not
mean that liberal society had no need for political
guarantees and direction.274 Liberalism required, as Locke
and others had said before, a government that would
deliberately create an economic system in which
competition would function as beneficially as possible.275
Much of The Road to Serfdom was dedicated to splitting the
difference between what such a state should look like, and
the unfortunate condition into which modern liberalism had
lapsed.
Splitting the difference required parsing the meaning of
“social planning.” Planning, in the general sense, was both
unavoidable and necessary.276 In fact, “good” planning could
270. Id. at 14.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 15.
273. Id. at 17.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See id. at 34 (“„Planning‟ owes its popularity largely to the fact that
everybody desires, of course, that we should handle our common problems as
rationally as possible and that, in so doing, we should use as much foresight as
we can command.”).
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get pretty extensive, running the gamut of whatever state
action might be necessary to ensure the free reign of
competition as the sole source of social organization.277 “In
no system that could be rationally defended would the state
just do nothing. An effective competitive system needs an
intelligently designed and continuously adjusted legal
framework as much as any other.”278 One might wonder
whether Hayek is hopelessly confused here: how can
“competition” function as the sole source of social
organization when he has already admitted that it is the
fundamental task of government to engage in “a wide and
unquestioned field”279 of social planning, namely, the idea of
planned competition? Hayek was ready for this response:
Competition and planning are mutually exclusive modes of
social organization.280 When we talk of “planning for
competition”281 this sharp distinction remains intact, since
the politics of the plan are never allowed to interfere with
the competitive principle once it has been established.282
Planning in this sense never becomes anything more than
the creation of means, or rules of permission.283 When social
planning enters the territory of shared ends, Hayek
instructs, it has gone off the mark.284
Hayek suggests that this important distinction becomes
clear when the problem of the economic planner is carefully
examined.285 In contrast to the military general who is
tasked with a precise and defined mission, and who is
warranted to use whatever means are at hand to accomplish
that mission, the economic planner is always faced with a
set of choices.286 These choices are inevitably distributive—
they will affect the gains and losses experienced by
particular groups in society. There is no convincing reason,
277. Id. at 39.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 42.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 60.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 64.
286. Id. at 64-65.
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however, why this man, whatever his partisan leanings
might be, should be able to make distributive decisions for a
society when the free reign of competition can do it so much
more efficiently, and justly to boot.287 Or rather, when the
distribution of gains and losses is left to the market, there
are no choices at all, and to the extent it is possible to
eliminate rules that are biased in favor of certain groups, all
such kinds of coercive restrictions should be abandoned.288
Thus, the beauty of the market is that it takes distributive
justice out of human hands, leaving it instead for a
benevolently invisible one.289
This style invokes, yet again, an image of a separation
between a public sphere, the purpose of which is to
constitute and maintain the free and natural operation of
the private sphere, governed by the singular principle of
competition. Problems set in, Hayek explained, when
competition and planning are mingled and mixed up, and
this is precisely what was happening in the modern welfare
state.290 In contrast to the good type of “planning for
competition,” predicated on a sharp distinction between the
market and politics, welfarism involves “planning against
competition,” and the attendant image of a porous dividing
line between state and market.291 This attitude towards an
unlimited sphere of state action, so long as it is fortifies
competition, implies a much more sophisticated approach to
law and politics than was available in the classic liberal
style. Importantly, Hayek underlines the idea that the
needs of a competitive society will evolve, thus necessitating
new innovations in governance strategy.292 This innovation
cannot come from a planned intervention, however. Instead,
there is a single way in which planning for competition can
take place, and that is in the hands of judges.
It is here that Hayek offers a related distinction
necessary to the neoliberal style, and that is between the

287. Id. at 64.
288. Id. at 65.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 61.
291. Id. at 42.
292. Id. at 43.
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“Rule of Law”293 and arbitrary and distributive legislation.
The Rule of Law, which some might intuit to be of pivotal
importance in its regulation of private intercourse, means
for Hayek “that government in all its actions is bound by
rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it
possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will
use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan
one‟s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”294
The market actor benefits from this restraint insofar he is
able to freely go about his business, without worry that the
powers of government will arbitrarily frustrate his aims.295
The key here is that the Rule of Law never aims at securing
the ends of any particular groups; it is only an instrument,
enabling people to pursue their own preferences.296 Beyond
this, the Rule of Law is also beneficial in that we cannot
know (even if we wanted to) what sorts of effects the Rule of
Law might have on the distributions of gains and losses in
society. “In fact, that we do not know their concrete effect,
that we do not know what particular ends these rules will
further, or which particular people they will assist,” is one
of the judiciary‟s greatest recommendations over the
legislature.297
Legislative planning, in contrast to the formal, neutral,
and ultimately moral nature of judicial decision-making, is
centralized and distributive, artificial, incapable of
digesting masses of market signals in order to produce
efficient policies, and inevitably held hostage to special
interest groups.298 Legislation is also destructive; the formal,
neutral posture of the Rule of Law “is in conflict, and in fact
incompatible, with any activity of the government
293. Id. at 72. I carry on with Hayek‟s own tendency to use capital letters in
designating what he meant by the Rule of Law. For broader discussions on the
idea of the rule of law, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY,
POLITICS, THEORY (2004); Alvaro Santos, The World Bank‟s Uses of the “Rule of
Law” Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos
eds., 2006). A classic statement is Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue,
93 LAW Q. REV. 195 (1977).
294. HAYEK, supra note 203, at 72.
295. Id. at 73.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 75.
298. Id. at 48.
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deliberately aiming at material or substantive equality of
different people, and that any policy aiming directly at a
substantive ideal of distributive justice must lead to the
destruction of the Rule of Law.”299
In Hayek‟s trilogy of the late 1970s, Law, Legislation
and Liberty, he provided a more detailed account for how
the Rule of Law was meant to function, and a better
description of its vehicle in the courts and the common law.
But before moving there, it is instructive in an account of
the neoliberal style to visit Ronald Coase‟s The Problem of
Social Cost,300 published sixteen years after The Road to
Serfdom. As mentioned above, at the time of Hayek‟s
writing in the mid-1940s, he was certainly in the minority.
In 1960, the modern variant of liberalism was still in firm
control, but the growth of the neoliberal critique was
mounting to such a degree that at this time “cracks were
beginning to appear in the foundation.”301 As Steven
Medema has argued, it was with Coase‟s challenge that, to
use another metaphor, the tide had begun to turn.302
For Hayek, one of the (wrong) arguments for the
inevitability of the interventionist state had been the shift
to monopoly capitalism towards the end of the nineteenth
century. Hayek believed that the real problem, largely
undiagnosed, was the aggravated incidence of state
interventions in the first place, having meddled too much in
the market over the establishment of trusts and
monopolies.303 Coase faced up against a related but different
argument for the necessity of state intervention in the
299. Id. at 79.
300. R.H. COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, reprinted in LAW, ECONOMICS,
PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION WITH APPLICATIONS TO THE LAW OF
TORTS 13, 13-40 (Mark Kuperburg & Charles Beitz eds., 1983). Coase is
traditionally credited with starting the law and economics movement of the late
twentieth century. Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the
Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499, 499 (2011).
AND

301. MEDEMA, supra note 159, at 102.
302. Id.
303. See infra notes 334-70 and accompanying text (discussing Hayek). In this
way, Hayek was performing a role diagnosed by Polanyi, wherein classic liberals
tended to blame the depression of the 1870s, rising unemployment, and
widening disparities between the rich and the poor, on state intervention, and
not on laissez-faire. Polanyi believed these arguments to be total nonsense. See
POLANYI, supra note 50, at 141-157.
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problem of externalities. Traditionally, welfare economists
identified certain costs associated with market transactions
that were never paid for by the transacting players.304 This
was a problem since it was possible that firms might be
systematically generating greater social costs than benefits,
shielded from the burden of making social compensations to
the third parties ostensibly bearing the burden of these
externalities.305 Because these social costs end up being
shouldered by third parties, government action was
necessary to correct for these failures to internalize the
costs of particular transactions, usually through some kind
of tax or penalty.306 What came to be known as Coase‟s
theorem set out to debunk this traditional response: in a
competitive market unobstructed by transaction costs and
supplied with perfect information, state action will never be
necessary to ensure the efficient allocation of resources. 307
(Like Hayek, “state action” in this case is a synonym for
arbitrary legislation; enforcement of the Rule of Law as
articulated in common law courts is not seen as “state
action,” and is instead used as a logical and factual
predicate for Coase‟s theorem).308
As for the argument, Coase brought in the now famous
example of the rancher and farmer. Conventionally, Coase
explained, government has reacted to the interaction of
rancher and farmer—where the rancher inevitably bumps a
cost onto his neighboring farmer through the damage
brought on by his grazing cattle—by imposing a fine on the
rancher.309 This is because the farmer has been harmed, and
the rancher should be restrained, through tort liability, or a
tax, or whatever.310 Coase countered in a Hohfeldian manner
304. See COASE, supra note 300, at 13. Coase opens with a reference to Pigou
as the standard response of economists to the problem of externalities. See
generally ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
305. COASE, supra note 300, at 13. As Coase states in the first sentence of the
essay: “This paper is concerned with those actions of business firms which have
harmful effects on others.” Id.
306. MEDEMA, supra note 159, at 102.
307. See infra notes 309-17 and accompanying text.
308. For general discussion of the idea of state action in the context of
neoliberalism, see Justin Desautels-Stein, Liberal Legalism and the Two State
Action Doctrines, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIB. (forthcoming 2012).
309. COASE, supra note 300, at 13-14.
310. Id. at 14.
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that what must be realized is that a decision to restrain the
rancher is just as much a harm as was the harm initially
done to the farmer.311 The question is inescapably relational.
The important social question is therefore not how best
to constrain the rancher, since this simply assumes that the
farmer has some inherent priority in the dispute, but rather
which of the harms is the least efficient in the allocation of
productive resources.312 “The nature of the choice is clear:
meat or crops. What answer should be given is, of course,
not clear unless we know the value of what is obtained as
well as the value of what is sacrificed to obtain it.”313 Coase
went on to suggest that a government official is unlikely to
know the answer to this question, or at the most generous,
he certainly won‟t know as well as the rancher and the
farmer.314 For example, if it‟s worth the rancher‟s while, he
will pay off the farmer (against the background of tort
liability), or bargain with the farmer in hopes of finding a
mutually agreeable deal (against the background of
property and contract law).315 In addition to these
background rules, Coase‟s image of the efficient deal also
assumes that the farmer and rancher are rational, selfinterested, have access to all the available information, and
are negotiating in a condition of perfect competition.316
Under these assumptions, public distributions of legal
entitlements at best have no effect on and at worst obstruct
what the market will achieve all by itself, pressuring the
rearrangement of legal rights (i.e., Rule of Law) wherever
they turn out to maximize the value of production.317
Throughout the essay, Coase asked how this idea plays
out when the “very unrealistic” assumptions are relaxed,
including when the problem of transaction costs is
introduced.318 This raises the problem of how best to mimic
the market, and who should do the mimicking. It‟s possible
311. Id.
312. Id. at 14.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 30.
315. Id. at 16-17.
316. Id. at 14-18.
317. See id. at 27.
318. Id.
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that certain arrangements of legal rights may better
compensate for these market deficiencies, or that those
costs might be better handled by large firms or even by
social planning.319 Another option is not to do anything at
all, since the total social costs of government intervention
may in many (most?) cases create new costs that weren‟t
there in the first place.320 The bottom line: in the presence of
transactions costs and imperfect competition, an economic
evaluation of particular legal arrangements will be
necessary to determine when and where social planning
might be necessary.321 Most importantly, this type of
pragmatic analysis should dispense with the default
position that government intervention is the proper
response to market failure, not only because government
itself is often the cause for that failure, but also because
“there is a real danger that extensive Government
intervention in the economic system may lead to the
protection of those responsible for harmful effects being
carried too far.”322
In 1964, Coase joined the faculty of the University of
Chicago, many of whom only a few years before had been
highly skeptical of Coase‟s challenge to welfare economics. 323
By the 1960s, these former students of Frank Knight were
Coasian converts, and the “Chicago School” was afoot.324 In
tandem with this academic reaction against modern
liberalism, an international economic crisis began to surface
in the late 1960s.325 The social program that had been in
place since the New Deal appeared to be breaking down:
unemployment and inflation were accelerating at a systemic
pace; tax revenues were falling while expenditures were
rising; the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates
was falling apart (and was abandoned in 1971); OPEC
hammered the developed world with an oil embargo.326 All in
319. See id. at 28-29.
320. Id. at 30.
321. See id. at 30-31.
322. Id. at 40.
323. MEDEMA, supra note 159, at 102, 104.
324. For a discussion of Coase‟s contributions to the development of the
Chicago School, see id. at 164-69.
325. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 12 (2005).
326. Id.
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all, the global economy appeared to be seeking the answers
already being worked out in Chicago.
By the last years of the 1970s, everything seemed in
place to inaugurate the neoliberal style.327 In 1979,
Margaret Thatcher was elected Prime Minister in Great
Britain, and brought with her an economic blitzkrieg which
involved:
[C]onfronting trade union power, attacking all forms of social
solidarity that hindered competitive flexibility . . . dismantling or
rolling back the commitments of the welfare state, the
privatization of public enterprises (including social housing),
reducing taxes, encouraging entrepreneurial initiative, and
creating a favourable business climate to induce a strong inflow of
328
foreign investment . . . .”

For Thatcher and her adherents, there was “no such thing
as society, only individual men and women.”329 In that same
year, Paul Volcker, chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve
Bank, reversed the long-standing New Deal commitment to
full employment in favor of a full-frontal attack on inflation,
launching what later came to be known as the “Volcker
Shock.”330 In 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected president,
deploying a set of policies aimed at the systemic
deregulation of industry, tax and budget cuts, and the
downsizing of organized labor.331 In 1982, the International
Monetary Fund (“IMF”) purged itself of its Keynesian
influences and leveraged the beginnings of its well-known
structural adjustment programs against the developing
world in return for debt rescheduling.332 As David Harvey
has described it, this exploding new style of political
economy proposed that:

327. See generally DEEPAK LAL, REVIVING THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE CASE FOR
CLASSICAL LIBERALISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 62-90 (2006); ANDREW
LANG, WORLD TRADE AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC
ORDER 52-57 (2011); YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 169.
328. HARVEY, supra note 325, at 22-23.
329. Id. at 23.
330. Id. at 23-24.
331. Id. at 24-25.
332. Id. at 29.

454

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

[H]uman well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free
markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and
preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.
. . . Furthermore, if markets do not exist . . . then they must be
created, by state action if necessary. . . . State interventions in
markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because,
according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough
information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because
powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state
interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own
333
benefit.”

Much as John Locke found himself writing at just the
right moment in the wake of the Glorious Revolution,334
Hayek published the third volume of Law, Legislation and
Liberty in 1979.335 Hayek began this ambitious work by
identifying what he called “three fundamental insights.”336
The first is that there is a right and a wrong way of
constructing our institutional arrangements. The right way
is to establish those institutions which enable a “selfgenerating or spontaneous order.”337 The wrong way is to
model society after an “organization.” The way we know the
right from the wrong way is by the type of laws which
prevail in them, respectively. The second insight was that
hopes for “social justice” only make sense in an
organization; they have no coherence in a spontaneous
society.338 The third was that the predominant style of
modern liberalism tends towards totalitarianism.339 The
discussion here will only focus on the first of these points.
Somewhat like Locke, Hayek begins his argument on
behalf of spontaneity by suggesting that the rules of classic
333. Id. at 2.
334. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
335. F.A. HAYEK, 3 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1979). It is unnecessary to
go into great detail with regard to all three books, but a presentation of Hayek‟s
richer account of the Rule of Law and its relation to the problem of monopolies
will be helpful as the discussion moves into the next sections of the Article.
336. F.A. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 2 (1973).
337. Id. at 2.
338. Id. at 2.
339. Id.
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liberalism are natural, but natural in a special way. For
Hayek, human beings are born with a cultural heritage
consisting of certain rules of just conduct. 340 These rules are
not laws in the sense that they have been authored by a
sovereign and backed with sanction.341 To the contrary,
these rules of conduct have evolved because they were
successful—they were victorious over other rules or customs
because they made for better lives.342 It would be a mistake
to believe, however, that the adherents of these customs
ever consciously promulgated them, or may have even been
able to articulate them. Customs were instead manifested in
the regularity of practice: “The important point is that every
man growing up in a given culture will find in himself rules,
or may discover that he acts in accordance with rules—and
will similarly recognize the actions of others as conforming
or not conforming to various rules.”343 What follows from
this spontaneous and organic conception of rules is the idea
that they cannot be attributed to any conscious, deliberate,
human design.344 These rules of conduct are therefore, by
definition, pre-political, just as in the same way that the
growth of organic compounds or the arrangement of
magnetic fields are wholly natural.345
Hayek argued against a presumption in favor of
government control over free competition, since the market
presents with “an order of such a degree of complexity . . . as
we could never master intellectually, or deliberately
arrange . . . .”346 All that political society can hope to do, and
indeed, what it must do, is play the night watchman.347 The
night watchman, guarding the factory from intruders and
guaranteeing the basic operations of the facility, has
nothing to say about the nature of goods that the factory
tends to produce, how quickly it produces, or anything of the
340. Id. at 18.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 19.
344. Id. at 28.
345. See id. at 39-40.
346. Id. at 41.
347. See id. at 47 (describing the function of the night watchman in terms of “a
maintenance squad of a factory”).
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like.348 Those questions are left instead to those that operate
the factory, and those that buy its products.349
Though the state plays a small role, Hayek reminds us
that the role of law, through the Rule of Law, is huge. The
difference here is between those rules that belong to
organized government—legislation—and those rules of
conduct imminent in the market.350 As Hayek explains,
legislation is necessarily distributive, while the Rule of Law
is “independent of purpose,” blindly and equally applicable
to all.351 Real freedom, as a result, is conditioned on a choice
of the Rule of Law over legislation, where the Rule of Law is
understood as permissive and enabling, and legislation is
prohibitive and coercive. While it is hopefully clear by now,
Hayek helpfully concludes that everything he has discussed
with regard to the rules of conduct operating in the
spontaneous order, and the willy-nilly legislative caprice of
governmental organization, tracks exactly the distinction
between private and public law, respectively.352 In a similar
vein, Hayek also explained that in the context of
constitutional law, its fame had been misconceived. 353 Its
job, and nothing grander, is simply to “secure the
maintenance of the law,”354 by which he means the Rule of
Law, funneled through the courts.
Hayek believed that property and contract were
essentially the heart of the Rule of the Law and the market
system. Taking us back to an unspecified time in history,
perhaps the moment of the man-eating-sheep,355 Hayek
argued that the “decisive step” which made peaceful
348. See id. (“[The maintenance squad‟s purpose is] not to produce any
particular services or products to be consumed by the citizens, but rather to see
that the mechanism which regulates the production of those goods and services
is kept in working order.”).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 72-74.
351. Id. at 49-50.
352. Id. at 132 (“[W]e shall henceforth regard the distinction between private
and public law as being equivalent to the distinction between rules of just
conduct and rules of organization . . . .”).
353. See id. at 134.
354. Id.
355. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
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cooperation possible was the discovery of the bargain.356 But
the ability to consistently determine what belonged to who,
and how one could trade one thing for another, depended on
the development of property and contract rules.357 If this
never were to happen, ideas like “ownership” and “bargain”
would never have had any real meaning.358 For Hayek,
these new rules of conduct were the mechanisms of coexistence, were definitively non-coercive, and had as their
central function the creation of a society in which people
with different outlooks on life, with different values for
different products, could live together in peace.359 What was
required was a law that told no man what he ought to do,
but could “tell each what he can count upon, what material
objects or services he can use for his purposes, and what is
the range of actions open to him.”360 Though Hayek
imagined the private law as non-coercive and pre-political
in a very strong sense, he nevertheless did, like Locke
before him, believe that the market brought with it more
than a sustainable peace (essential as that was), but a just
society as well.361 It was not that either of them thought that
the moral content of property and contract would generate
any particular constellation of social outcomes, but rather
that it was the process of the private law that was just:
In this respect what has been correctly said of John Locke‟s view
on the justice of competition, namely, that “it is the way in which
competition is carried on, not its result, that counts,” is generally
true of the liberal conception of justice, and of what justice can
362
achieve in a spontaneous order.

Hayek wants us to believe that the Rule of Law that he
describes, and the manipulation of those rules of just
conduct by the common law courts, do not in any fashion
356. F.A. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 109 (1976)
357. Id. (“All that was required to bring this about was that rules be
recognized which determined what belonged to each, and how such property
could be transferred by consent.”).
358. See id. at 35 (“Such states as „ownership‟ have no significance except
through the rules of conduct which refer to them . . . .”).
359. Id. at 110.
360. Id. at 37.
361. Id. at 38.
362. Id.
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constitute “planning” or “intervention.”363 Just as the
clockmaker, in setting out the twelve numbers on the face of
a clock, or regularly oiling and winding it, is not
“interfering” with the clock‟s chief functions, so it is that the
common law judge, in elaborating and developing the
ground rules of market competition, does not “interfere”
with competition, either.364
But what of the law of competition, that hallmark
response of the welfare style to the apparently grim fact of
gigantic trusts and managerial capitalism? Does antitrust
law belong to the beautiful Rule of Law or the grotesque
sphere of legislation? Clearly, if you are a fan of the
Hayekian style, you will hope for the former over the latter.
Hayek‟s discussion of the problem is reminiscent of the
Senate debates of the 1890s, insomuch as he begins by
suggesting that a monopolist cannot be identified as a
systemic defect so long as he is simply playing the
competitive game really, really well. In fact, it must be
admitted that in these cases the monopolist or oligopolist is
likely rendering better services than anyone else.365 If this
point regarding the potential efficiencies associated with
monopolies is not conceded, it would inevitably lead to a
critique of the ground rules themselves, which no liberal
style of political economy can countenance. On the other
hand, if the monopolist has gained his position by disabling
his competitors in the market, such that they are unable to
play at all, this is an instance of pathology.366
Hayek‟s answer is not difficult to predict: to the extent
the monopolist‟s competitors are empowered as watchdogs,
as reined in by the common law judge, this will constitute a
check that could be consistent with the Rule of Law. To the
extent that government itself makes an effort to distinguish
the good monopolies and cartels from the bad, it will almost
always fail.367 The only conceivable way for a planned
intervention to have any success in mimicking the Rule of
363. See id. at 128-29 (defining “interference” as aiming to bring about a
particular result, as opposed to allowing a mechanism to proceed along its
natural course).
364. Id.
365. HAYEK, supra note 335, at 73-74.
366. Id. at 73.
367. Id. at 85-86.
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Law would be to deprive the antitrust enforcer of any
discretion whatsoever—and enact a general pronouncement
banning all agreements in restraint of trade.368 However this
plays out, Hayek concludes, there is decisively more to gain
from less government involvement in the issue of
monopolization than in its participation, particularly since
it is government planning itself which has so often been the
very cause of inefficient and undesirable monopolies in the
first place.369 Finally, when we think of monopolization, and
the conventional governmental response, Hayek argued
that the target has almost entirely been misconceived. The
problem was not really ever the combination of a few big
firms; it was the ascendance of the union.370
II. A CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL LEGALISM
The prior discussion has outlined three liberal visions of
a relation between “market” and “state.” Classic liberalism
and neoliberalism shared a great deal in common, as
illustrated in a sample of texts from John Locke, Ronald
Coase, and Friedrich Hayek. In these styles, a strong
distinction between civil society and the state is posited,
where individuals freely exercise natural rights that are
meant to be serviced through the operation of the state. As
a consequence, the state‟s purpose is to work as the
handmaiden of the market, enabling the operation of free
competition as the organizing concept for all of society. In
contrast is the modern liberal style, illustrated here in the
work of Henry Carter Adams and Frank Knight. For these
writers and so many others, the distinction between civil
society and the state is retained, but the precise line
defining the boundary becomes far less important. In
modern liberalism, the state is not merely in service of the
market, existing merely as its enabler. Here, the state is
tasked with control, reigning in the persistent problem of
market failure and its attendant effects. Thus, the modern
liberal style takes a far more aggressive and enlarged view
of law. In contrast to the classic liberal and neoliberal
emphasis on the Rule of Law, quietly operating in the
background, the modern liberal style deploys an armada of
368. HAYEK, supra note 356, at 86.
369. Id. at 88.
370. Id. at 89.
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foreground rules in its attempt to regulate, manage, and
constrain free markets. As we have seen, antitrust law is a
good example of such a foreground rule, precisely because it
situates itself as merely responding (in the foreground) to a
pre-existing world of markets. Antitrust law, and the
modern liberal style more generally, never intends to
actually displace or transform the background rules (i.e.
property, contract, etc.) themselves.
In this Part, the discussion turns to critiques of liberal
legalism.371 The style of critique that I will here emphasize
has two elements. The first is a critique of the constitutive
nature of background legal rules in both the classic and
modern liberal images of political economy. As we have
seen, this is the idea that property and contract are the
ground rules of the economic game.372 In opposition to the
likes of Hayek, the view explored below suggests that it is a
mistake to believe these background rules to be neutral
with respect to distributive gains and losses, natural with
respect to a fictitious distinction between a natural civil
society and an artificial political society, or necessary with
respect to an inevitable historical progression. A related
idea here is that it is a mistake to think that a presumption
in favor of the enforcement of property and contract rights,
in the abstract, is a presumption with any meaning. In
other words, the “background rules of the market” are only
understandable once we have a particular form of liberalism
offering a particular form of property and contract. For
liberal legalists to argue for strong property and contract
rights, without specifying which property and contract
rights to which they are referring, they make the mistake
not only of confusing one single vision of the market with
371. As is well known, a sustained critique of classic liberalism was deployed
from the political left before it became a mainstream talking point around the
turn of the twentieth century. As far back as Karl Marx, market society was
already being targeted as a masquerade. Unlike the liberal legal styles,
however, these critical approaches have never gained entrance in the field of
popular political trends. No doubt, the Left has had its effects, and not simply in
the socialist revolutions of the nineteenth century or the communist revolutions
of the twentieth. It is now a commonplace that the “social-democratic
compromise” that took place after World War II among the western
industrialized nations, referred to here as “modern liberalism,” struck a balance
between the discredited ideas of the classics and the very real policy proposals
hurtling from the left.
372. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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the idea of a true and actual market. They also make the
mistake of being unintelligible.
The second component of the critique to be canvassed
here is a rejection of the standard dichotomy we have
repeatedly seen between civil society and the state, free
competition and social planning, the private and the public.
It is mistake, as the modern liberal view would have it, to
believe that the market is an independent sphere that is
either allowed to regulate itself, or is at other times subject
to the heavy hand of planned interventionism. The market
has never regulated itself, can never regulate itself, nor can
we accurately understand government as sometimes
intervening more or less intrusively. The reason is that the
“market” is not an “itself”—it is a set of choices, made by
human beings, and human beings continue to choose how
they want the background rules of the market to function.
The question for critics is therefore not whether more or less
coercion is better or worse—coercion is inescapable. The
idea that coercion and control are relegated to a singular
domain of sovereign authority while freedom and
competition are sovereign in the market is an illusion. The
real question is instead: what types of policy do we want,
and which social actors do we want making the relevant
decisions? To talk of more or less of the state is simply to
confuse the issue that really matters.
In the survey that follows, and in which these two
elements of a critique of liberal legalism are brought
together, the discussion turns to some works from Karl
Marx, Morris Cohen, Robert Hale, and Duncan Kennedy.
A. A Critique of the Market/State Distinction
In his early essay On the Jewish Question,373 Karl Marx
analyzed the classic liberal style‟s insistence on a separation
of political society from natural society, and what this
separation really meant in terms of liberalism‟s own deepest
aspirations for human freedom. His conclusion was that the
liberal method undermined its supposed objective: where
Locke argued that the move to political society was the key
to human freedom because it placed the sacred rights of life
373. KARL MARX, On the Jewish Question (1843), reprinted in WRITINGS OF THE
YOUNG MARX ON PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY 216 (Loyd D. Easton & Kurt H.
Guddat eds. & trans., 1967).
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and property under the watchful eye of a common
authority,374 Marx argued that this move, while indisputably
progressive, achieved a degree of political freedom at the
expense of a true form of human emancipation. Here‟s how
the argument works.
According to Marx, the liberal image of market society
involves a dichotomous human existence in which Locke‟s
conception of the “Natural Man” partially exists in political
society (where he is a citizen with rights and duties owed to
others), and partially exists in a non-political civil society
(where he is a human with desires and needs, using other
people as means to satisfy those desires and needs). 375 In
political life, the citizen is a communal being, and free from
the hindrance of religious and other self-identified forms of
difference which inevitably atomize people and emasculate
social relationships.376 Curiously, it is only in this artificial
political world that Natural Man enjoys a common
humanity in the understanding that he is a vital part of a
social organism.377
In private life, Natural Man is empowered with a set of
rights that by their definition exclude and separate him
from everyone else. It is in this sphere that he is truly
himself, in touch with the real and natural spirit of his
being, isolated, alone, and enterprising. Natural Man is
free, in the sense that he can do anything he likes, but only
so long as he doesn‟t impinge on the same freedom enjoyed
by his neighbors.378 Natural Man therefore inhabits in his
private life an enclosed space in which he is sovereign—this
is the liberty of the “isolated monad, withdrawn into
374. See supra Part I.A.2.
375. See MARX, supra note 373, at 224-25.
376. Id. at 225 (“In the political community [man] regards himself as a
communal being . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). Herbert Marcuse put it this way:
“They were really emancipated. The „natural‟ and personal dependencies of the
feudal order had been abolished. . . . The primary conditions of capitalism were
herewith at hand: free wage labor and private property in the means of
commodity production.” HERBERT MARCUSE, REASON AND REVOLUTION: HEGEL
AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL THEORY 305-06 (2d ed. 1954). The production of
commodities, he goes on to say, begins with the labor contract, “ostensibly the
realization of freedom, equality, and justice.” Id. at 306.
377. MARX, supra note 373, at 225 (emphasizing that, in civil, as opposed to
political society, man is a private being).
378. Id. at 235.
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himself.”379 It is a right of separation, a right of restricted
space, practically enabled and realized through the law of
private property.380 This highly individualized and selfinterested conception of the private, pre-political world has
the effect of turning one‟s friends and neighbors into the
barriers to one‟s own freedom, instead of seeing other
people, and social relationships, as the means for becoming
truly free, for realizing the true nature of human freedom.
Even worse, the sphere in which human beings take on the
tendencies of a community—political life—is understood to
merely serve the emaciated existence of civil society. Society
barely hangs together at all: “The only bond between men is
natural necessity, need and private interest, the
maintenance of their property and egoistic persons.”381
Marx rooted this liberal division of man from man in
what Partha Chatterjee has called “the narrative of
capital.”382 That narrative, with which we are now familiar,
identified the establishment of a distinct and separate
realm of politics as the destruction of the medieval world, a
world we have seen to have been integrated in the sense
that it was largely free from distinctions between private
and public, natural and political.383 Feudal society was
“directly political,” meaning that constructs like land,
family, and work were recognized vehicles of governance, as
opposed to the more familiar sense of them being the objects
of control.384 The effect was to convert the particular relation
man would have between him and the state into a general
relation between man and man. Because land, family, and
work were already politicized, the mechanics of the state
and the actual government were kept at a distance.385 What
Liberalism did was to banish that political dimension from
land, family, and work, and concentrate it in the sphere of
government.386 According to Marx:
379. Id.
380. Id. at 235-36.
381. Id. at 237.
382. PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS 234-39 (1993).
383. See id. at 239.
384. Id. at 238.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 239. Georg Lukács perceptibly echoes Locke‟s idea that political
society cannot even be properly called government unless it protects property
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[Liberalism] shattered civil society into its constituent elements—
on the one hand individuals and on the other the material and
spiritual elements constituting the vital content and civil situation
of these individuals. It released the political spirit, which had
been broken, fragmented, and lost, as it were, in the various culde-sacs of feudal society. It gathered up this scattered spirit,
liberated it from its entanglement with civil life, and turned it into
the sphere of the community, the general concern of the people
387
ideally independent of these particular elements of civil life.

Thus, the shift Marx is describing here represented a
change from a condition where man‟s relation to the land on
which he lived and worked, to his guild members, to his wife
and children were always already politicized, into a very
different condition in which these relations were suddenly
naturalized. The content of the political, and its interest in
the distribution of wealth and resources, had gone
elsewhere.
The creation of political society was therefore attended
by a simultaneous and second creation: Locke‟s Natural
Man.388 Natural Man is the new recipient of “natural rights,”
rights that will subsequently come to be the object of
protection by the new political society. But as we have seen,
the human being is also a political man, though this is an
abstract, artificial, and juridical person, in contrast to the
immediate, concrete, organic person in civil society. For
Marx, the way forward inevitably would necessitate an
elimination of this alienation of the self, and ultimately call
forth a total, human freedom undisturbed by liberalism‟s

rights in his analysis of the classic liberal relation between market and state.
For Lukács, the market was dependent on a government that made itself in the
market‟s image: “The capitalist process of rationalisation based on private
economic calculation requires that every manifestation of life shall exhibit this
very interaction between details which are subject to laws and a totality ruled
by chance. It presupposes a society so structured.” LUKÁCS, supra note 164, at
102. These laws which are to mirror the dynamics of market calculation,
however, cannot take on a truly rational form in that they must be barred from
ever micro-managing the decisions of particular market actors: “But such a „law‟
would have to be the „unconscious‟ product of the activity of the different
commodity owners acting independently of one another, i.e. a law of mutually
interacting „coincidences‟ rather than one of truly rational organisation.” Id.
387. MARX, supra note 373, at 239.
388. See supra Part I.A.2.
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political/natural distinction—a call that would collapse the
apparent difference between citizen and human.389
But Marx‟s way forward is not what we‟re after here.
B. A Critique of Property and Contract
Though the discussion has so far described only a very
small, and in some circles controversial,390 portion of Marx‟s
work, there is nothing in his immense oeuvre that enables
his critique to reach the idea that law plays a constitutive
role in the construction of the liberal distinction between
market and state. Marx is fundamental in offering a
critique of the idea that civil society could somehow be
understood as genuinely apolitical; the notion of a natural
man and a natural society, separated from a political,
distributivist society was upon inspection an incredible
sham, an astounding parlor trick, resulting in the estranged
separation of man from himself. What Marx failed to reach,
however, was the nature in which legal background rules
forged the façade.391 It was to this point that writers in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century turned in their
elaboration of the critical style.392 In setting this out, I will
389. See MARX, supra note 373, at 241.
390. There is a long-standing debate among Marxists as to whether Marx‟s
early writings are in combat with his more mature works. See, e.g., LOUIS
ALTHUSSER, „On the Young Marx,‟ in FOR MARX 49, 52 (Ben Brewster trans.,
1969) (1965) (“[W]e must admit that Capital (and „mature Marxism‟ in general)
is either an expression of the Young Marx‟s philosophy, or its betrayal.”
(emphasis omitted)); see also G.A. COHEN, KARL MARX‟S THEORY OF HISTORY: A
DEFENCE (Princeton Univ. Press expanded ed. 2001) (providing a separate
debate within Marxism regarding the coherence of the dialectical method).
391. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, in SEXY
DRESSING ETC. 83, 90 (1993) (distinguishing Marxism from the liberal model in
that liberalism focuses on the background of legal rules). To be sure, Marx was
very aware of the role of property law in its fundamental relation to liberal
political economy. His view of the law, however, failed to understand its
constitutive nature, and focused instead on law as superstructural. See, e.g.,
COHEN, supra note 390, at 216-40.
392. For two of the well-known works from the school of Institutional
Economics that attempted to elaborate on the background rules, see JOHN R.
COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924) and RICHARD T. ELY,
PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
(1914). For discussion of both works, see Hovenkamp, supra note 167, at 102131.
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focus on three articles written in the 1920s and 1930s by
Robert Hale, lawyer and economist at Columbia University,
and Morris Cohen, philosopher and Professor at the City
College of New York.393
In Property and Sovereignty, Cohen wrote:
Certain things have to be done in a community and the question
whether they should be left to private enterprise dominated by
profit motive or to the government dominated by political
considerations, is not a question of man versus the state, but
simply a question of which organization and motive can best do
the work. Both private and government enterprise are initiated
394
and carried through by individual human beings.

Similarly, in his Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, Hale argued that the modern welfare
critique of laissez-faire had been misguided.395 Anticipating
Polanyi, it was not simply that the self-regulated market
needed to be checked—the self-regulated market had never
been. In the real world, the actual function of laissez-faire
was shot through with coercive restrictions on individual
freedom, restrictions “out of conformity with any formula of
„equal opportunity,‟ or of „preserving the equal rights of
others.‟”396 In any modern society, such restrictions were
unavoidable, and the only question was when and how to
393. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933)
[hereinafter Cohen, Contract]; Moris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927) [hereinafter Cohen, Property]; Robert L. Hale, Coercion
and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923)
[hereinafter Hale, Coercion]. For further discussion of Hale and Cohen, see
BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE
AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998); Neil Duxbury, Robert
Hale and the Economy of Legal Force, 53 MOD. L. REV. 421 (1990); Warren J.
Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power and Its Legal Bases: The Legal
Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261 (1973); and Joseph
William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1988). Some of
Hale‟s other particularly well-known writings include ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM
THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER (1952); Robert L.
Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943);
Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of “Political” and “Economic”
Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935).
394. Cohen, Property, supra note 393, at 27.
395. Hale, Coercion, supra note 393, at 470.
396. Id.
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coerce whom, and where to direct the distribution of income
and resources.397
A similarly foundational critique aimed at the liberal
distinction between rules of permission versus rules of
prohibition. Marx saw the beginnings of this critique:
Political economy starts with the fact of private property, but it
does not explain it to us. It expresses in general, abstract formulas
the material process through which private property actually
passes, and these formulas it then takes for laws. It does not
comprehend these laws, i.e., it does not demonstrate how they
398
arise from the very nature of private property.

Where Marx left this insight inchoate, Hale and Cohen
developed it, showing how rules popularly believed to
simply enable free action were deeply prohibitive—the very
idea of permission, they explained, depended on a prior idea
of coercion.399
These conclusions might be seen as the endpoint in this
Part: private enterprise and government enterprise are
equal in the sense that they each have organizational
capacities predicated on a substantial, though different,
degree of sovereign and coercive power. But how was it that
the private side could be seen as sovereign and coercive?
397. Id.
398. Karl Marx, Estranged Labor (1844), reprinted in ECONOMIC AND
PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, at 106, 106 (Dirk J. Struik ed., Martin
Milligan trans., 1964).
399. Duncan Kennedy put it this way:
In the liberal model, law plays a major role in the form of “the rule
of law,” a defining element in the liberal conception of a good society.
But the content of the background of legal rules is seen to flow either as
a matter of logic from regime-defining first principles (rights of bodily
security, private property, freedom of contract) or from the will of the
people, or from both together in some complex combination. The
distributive issue is present, but understood as a matter of legislative
intervention (for example, progressive taxation, labor legislation) to
achieve distributive objectives by superimposition on an essentially
apolitical private law background. . . .
A basic reason for the invisibility of the distributional consequences
of law is that we don‟t think of ground rules of permission as ground
rules at all, by contrast with rules of prohibition.
KENNEDY, supra note 391, at 90.

468

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

The answer was to be found in a sociology of property and
contract law.
To begin, Cohen suggested, it is essential to move
beyond the old picture of property as a relation between
man and the products of his labor.400 It will be recalled that
in the classic style, man was imagined to first have
ownership over his body, then ownership over those things
with which he mixed his labor.401 After the invention of
money and an allowance for freedom of contract, man‟s
capacity for private property—ownership of things—was
virtually limitless. In a move that would have pleased
Coase, Cohen argued that this simply didn‟t make any
sense, since a “property right is a relation not between an
owner and a thing, but between the owner and other
individuals in reference to things. A right is always against
one or more individuals.”402
At its basic essence, the right to private property is a
right of exclusion.403 The law does not grant any actual
connection between a man and his land, food, car, or money.
What it does instead is grant that man the power to wield
the force of governmental power against any other people
that may try to use that land, food, etc.404 If he wants to use
that thing, he must gain the “owner‟s” consent, and if he
400. Cohen, Property, supra note 393, at 11-12.
401. See supra Part I.A.2.
402. Cohen, Property, supra note 393, at 12. The argument that rights could
not be understood as relations between people and things, but only as between
rights and correlative duties, is typically attributed to Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). Also affiliated with legal realism, Hohfeld‟s
signal contribution was to organize all of legal reasoning around a set of eight
legal correlatives: rights/duties, privileges/no-right, power/liability, and
immunity/disability. Id. at 30. The impact of the scheme was to smash the idea
of a unitary, abstracted idea of rights, including property rights. After Hohfeld,
the question of what was meant by a property right would necessarily require a
relational answer that described the constellation of rights, duties, powers, and
privileges enjoyed by a particular person at a particular moment. For a
discussion of Hohfeld‟s relational approach to rights, see Wesley Hohfeld, in THE
CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 174, at 45, 45-54; Joseph
William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 986-1050.
403. Cohen, Property, supra note 393, at 12.
404. Id.
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gets it, use of those objects will be allowed. But whatever
the decision of the owner, what the law is actually doing is
forcing a barrier between the two individuals, and making
the consent of one the requisite for use by the other. The
necessity of consent begins to reveal its sovereign aspects
when the fact of scarcity is introduced: there isn‟t enough
land and food freely available for all members of society,
and so it quickly becomes clear that if one man is to survive,
he must find shelter, food, and the like. In the context of the
private property regime, however, this man cannot simply
use any shelter or food that he might find—he will have to
gain consent from some landlord, grocer, whomever, who is
willing to let the man share in their property. To do that,
the man will need money.405 If he doesn‟t have money, he
will die as a result of the law enabling the landlord and
grocer to exclude the man indefinitely. Not wanting to die,
most people will therefore be forced to sell their labor in
exchange for a common currency, and as a result, be able to
bargain with the landlord and the grocer. It is in this sense
that Cohen characterized the law of property as “sovereign
power compelling service and obedience.”406
Hale offered a similar route into the coercive properties
of property law. He began by setting up the classic image of
a non-interventionist government on the one side, and the
freely competitive society on the other.407 In this picture, just
what was government doing when it “protects a property
right?”408 In one sense, it is creating a relationship between
the owner and government in which the government has no
presumptive power to interfere with the owner‟s use of the
thing.409 This seems non-interventionist. When the relation
between the owner and the non-owner is considered,
however, the flavor shifts dramatically from one of
abstention to active governmental coercion.
To further the illustration from above, Hale explains
that the non-owner, the man looking for food and shelter,
faces a situation more drastic than simply one of being
forced to not be lazy. Say that the man who owns no
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Hale, Coercion, supra note 393, at 470-71.
408. Id. at 471.
409. See id.
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property—the non-owner—does not want to labor for a
particular employer. He will face two alternatives: no
wages, or work for some other employer.410 Because of the
law of property, all alternative employers are able to
forcibly threaten the non-owner with withholding any
wages, unless he becomes willing to labor for that
employer.411 This threat to withhold money will usually be
enough to compel the non-owner to work—a motivation to
labor that can be understood exclusively as an attempt to
ward off threats of withholding. Now, if most people will be
coerced into work as a result of the property law,412 what of
those who refuse? The (landless) non-owner still has to eat,
even if he remains free of private coercion, but in order to
eat, he will have to convince other members of the
community to share with him, since property law forecloses
his ability to consume anything he might find.413 Owners
may, at their discretion, waive their power and share their
food with the non-owner, but there will always be “every
likelihood that the owners will be unanimous in refusing, if
he has no money.”414 So unless he can produce his own food,
which is doubtful since he owns no land, the non-owner will
starve unless he gives in to the pressure to labor for
wages.415 In addition to a workforce, property law also
guarantees a stream of revenue.416 As the entrepreneur
develops products with the assistance of the non-owner,
consumers who would like to enjoy those products have to
gain the producer‟s consent.417 They are strictly prohibited
from consuming the products without it.418 Consumers may
wish to avoid payment by going without those products, just
as they may wish to avoid governmental taxes by leaving
the country.419 In either case, the consumer will be
410. See id. at 472.
411. Id. at 473.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
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compelled to pay if he wishes to avoid the threat of
punishment (i.e., going without consumer goods, or paying a
fine or going to prison).420
The upshot, Hale tells us, is that large employers are
secured a labor-force, with little if any alternatives for
survival, by and through the coercive nature of property
law, as it have been conceived in the classic liberal style.421
Similarly, producers are guaranteed revenue by the same
set of coercive arrangements.422 Thus, the distribution of
incomes throughout the sphere of wage-labor, and the
allocation of goods and services more generally, is entirely
dependent on “the relative strength of [each person‟s] power
of coercion, offensive and defensive.”423
If non-owners and consumers are systemically subject to
the coercive power of owners and producers, there may be
some question as to whether “freedom” is a meaningful
concept. After all, the classic liberal style is very concerned
with establishing freedoms in the private sphere through
the mechanism of minimalist governmental control. If
coercion is rampant, classic liberalism seems to have failed.
What turns the argument around is some precision with
regard to what we mean by freedom. Hale suggests that if it
were decided to take control away from a factory owner
(through a re-alignment of the property and contract
regime) and vest it instead in some other set of people, like
a group of public officials, or a union, this cannot be
properly understood to be making the functional existence
of the factory any more officially coercive than it had been
when it was in the control of the owner.424 The same coercive
dimensions will continue, but such a transfer would simply
shift the power of exclusive restrictions to a different set of
people.425 It is true, Hale explains, that one arrangement
over another might provide varying degrees of individual

420. See id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 477.
424. Id. at 478.
425. Id.
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initiative—but individual initiative is hardly the same thing
as “freedom from governmental constraint.”426
The former is the political idea that a person will be
able to realize their will, regardless of what prerequisites
may be in order. The latter is a natural idea that freedom
will always be maximized when government limits its
coercive powers in the private sphere. But the latter type of
freedom is not a meaningful kind of freedom at all, since it
is impossible to reduce coercive restrictions.427 Thus, if we
really want to know what sort of institutional arrangement
most effectively secures the capacity for free individual
initiative, the only measure of such a thing is in the
economic results of that particular factory.428 In this way,
Hale concluded, it is impossible to say in the abstract
whether communism is any more free than capitalism.429
In addition to property law, Hale and Cohen also aimed
to underline the neglected shades of contract law in the
classic image. The connection between contract and
property, as passively suggested in no less a context than
Locke‟s Second Treatise, seemed clear enough.430 After all, if
the future of economic development turned on the capacity
to exclude, buy, and sell, market actors would of necessity
engage in the bargaining process, otherwise known as
freedom of contract.431 But just as with property law,
426. Id. at 478.
427. Cohen, Contract, supra note 393, at 560.
428. See Hale, Coercion, supra note 393, at 478.
429. Id.
430. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (describing Locke‟s
conception of contract and property).
431. Joseph Singer has identified three principles of the “free contract system”:
First, you cannot be forced to contract against your will. This principle
implied defenses against contractual liability when there was a defect
in free will, such as fraud, duress, or incapacity, and rules about what
constitutes free agreement, including rules of offer and acceptance and
consideration as evidence of intent to be legally bound. Second, you are
free to contract if you wish to do so. This principle implied rules
specifying what conduct creates a binding obligation, and rules
concerning what constitutes a breach of that obligation and the
consequences of a breach. Third, if you do contract, your agreement will
be enforced in accordance with its terms. The state refuses to regulate
the substantive terms of private relations.
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contract law turned out to be hardly free in the noninterventionist meaning of the term, and was riddled
through with coercive restrictions and distributive
consequences.
Cohen‟s The Basis of Contract brought focus to Henry
Maine‟s famous thesis that liberal society had brought with
it a transformation where people no longer related to one
another by way of their respective status (i.e., master,
servant, father, son), but instead through a system where
individual rights and duties were determined by the
voluntary agreements of the parties to the contract.432 Below
the surface is a familiar picture: there is only one form of
morally acceptable obligation that may be placed on the
individual, namely, that obligation to which he has
consented. Other forms of coercive restriction should be
avoided at all costs, and to the extent government interferes
in the market, it is obstructing the individual‟s free will.
Freedom of contract, as a result, has deep roots in classic
liberalism, in tandem with the fundamental quality of
private property.
Cohen then asked, in what sense is bargaining actually
free? Do contracts realize this notion of voluntary
agreement and consent? To begin, all contracts specialists
know of those categories which by definition have little if
anything to do with voluntary agreement.433 When a man
buys a train ticket, or buys a bag of peanuts from a vendor,
we presume tacit consent on the part of the buyer that he
has agreed to pay whatever price the seller has decided to
assign. But though a court will deem the transaction a
Singer, supra note 409, at 479. Duncan Kennedy has defined “the will theory of
contract liability” in the following way:
The will theory of contract liability states that all the rules of law
that compose the law of contracts can be developed from the single
proposition that the law of contract protects the wills of the contracting
parties. Thus we can define the law of capacity (duress and infancy, for
example) to protect will, likewise the law of fraud, of damages, of offer
and acceptance, of breach, of excuses, of contract interpretation, and so
forth.
Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy:
Lon Fuller‟s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 115 (2000).
432. Cohen, Contract, supra note 393, at 553 (citing HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT
LAW 100 (Dutton 1972) (1861)).
433. Id. at 568.
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contract, no one believes that the man getting on the train
or eating peanuts has actually bargained his way into a deal
that suited his will.434 Beyond this obvious issue, Cohen
pointed to employment as a more serious example of the
same phenomenon. When creating the labor contract, no
worker bargains with the large employer in any meaningful
sense.435 He can agree to the terms of work, or go down the
rabbit‟s hole described above, and the larger the employer,
the deeper the stakes:
The greater economic power of the employer exercises a
compulsion as real in fact as any now recognized by law as duress.
The extreme form of such duress, the highwayman‟s pistol, still
leaves us with the freedom to accept the terms offered or else take
the consequences. But such choice is surely the very opposite of
436
what men value as freedom.

In such circumstances, we may meaningfully ask whether
the old law of master and servant has been superseded.437
Given such considerations, Cohen moved for an
alternative view of contract law. As opposed to searching
the meaning of contract for an articulation of voluntary
agreement—a distillation of free will—a better view was to
see contract as an agreement between parties that would
distribute gains and losses in an anticipated future
situation.438 If Morris sells Robert 100 widgets for $10,
Morris expects to lose a hundred of his widgets, and gain
ten dollars. Expectations are not always realized, however,
and the widgets may turn out to be less than what Robert
expected, or God may act, or Morris may have all of his
widgets stolen. In this sense, contract law may be
understood as that set of rules that will determine who will
win and lose when unexpected situations arise.439 “One can
therefore say that the court‟s adjudication supplements the
original contract as a method of distributing gains and
losses.”440
434. Id. at 568-69.
435. Id. at 569.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 583.
439. Id. at 584.
440. Id.
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To be sure, Cohen recognized that one function of
contract law was to ensure the enforceability and
predictability of promises. But instead of this being the core
of contract law, Cohen believed it to be simply a limiting
principle.441 The core is a distributivist mechanism, aimed at
answering who should lose when Morris‟ widgets were
stolen, or were lost in transit, or were somehow other than
what Robert had expected. The crucial point for Cohen was
that the distributivist element in contract law was thickly
obscured by its pretensions as a vehicle for free will, and
that as a result, the political questions of who should gain
and who should lose (a definitively political question about
the justness of distribution) are never scrutinized. Further,
it was hardly the case that these distributions of gains and
losses were simply the products of individual agency:
It is an error then to speak of the law of contracts as if it merely
allows people to do things. The absence of criminal prohibition
will do that much. The law of contract plays a more positive rôle
in social life, and this is seen when the organized force of the state
is brought into play to compel the loser of a suit to pay or to do
442
something.

Given this, there seemed little credible way of
distinguishing contract law from any other form of coercive,
public law:
The law of contract, then, through judges, sheriffs, or marshals
puts the sovereign power of the state at the disposal of one party
to be exercised over the other party. . . .
From this point of view the law of contract may be viewed as a
subsidiary branch of public law, as a body of rules according to
which the sovereign power of the state will be exercised as
443
between the parties to a more or less voluntary transaction.

Generally speaking, Cohen argued, public law rules
regulate the scope of official state power, as in the context of
constitutional law.444 In this domain, the legislature enacts
laws at its discretion, and the judiciary enacts laws that
441. Id. at 584-85.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 586.
444. Id.
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purport to set the limits of that discretion.445 When the
judiciary so acts, it promulgates what is often called private
law—the law of corporations, leases, contract, insurance,
and so on.446 But the public and private law is hardly as
different as it might appear, for just as the constitution
provides the legislature with ample room to fill gaps and
serve social needs, so does the law of contract provide
individual persons with ample room to fill gaps and serve
needs.447 When private parties contract with each other,
formalizing their rights and duties with respect to one
another, these contracts become “the law of the land, just as
much as do treaties between our nation and others,
compacts between states, contracts between a state . . . and
a private corporation,” and so on.448 Similarly, just as an
agreement between a state actor and a private actor will
compose a part of the legal order in which all participate, so
does an agreement between, say, a trade union and a single
employee, or a corporate charter, represent a legal threshold
through which all those wishing to enter the industry will
be forced to pass.449
If we cannot meaningfully distinguish the public law
from the private (since in either case, sovereign power will
be conferred on some party to the transaction, be it the
legislature or John Smith), Cohen concluded, we must
confront the question of whether and when we as a society
want sovereign power funneled through the transactions of
publically unaccountable market actors:
To put no restrictions on the freedom of contract would logically
lead not to a maximum of individual liberty but to contracts of
slavery, into which, experience shows, men will „voluntarily‟ enter
under economic pressure—a pressure that is largely conditioned
by the law of property. Regulations, therefore, involving some
restrictions on the freedom to contract are as necessary to real
liberty as traffic restrictions are necessary to assure real freedom
450
in the general use of our highways.

445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 586-87.
448. Id. at 587.
449. Id.
450. Id.
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Summing up, Cohen wrote: “Real or positive freedom
depends upon opportunities supplied by institutions that
involve legal regulation. Our legislative forces may be
narrowly partisan and the rules may be poor ones. But this
can be remedied not by the abrogation of all rules but by the
institution of better ones.”451
C. A Critique of Legal Consciousness
The writings of critics like Robert Hale and Morris
Cohen went out of style as American society moved through
and after the New Deal. They were overwhelmed by the
programmatic apparatus that emerged after World War II
and the modern liberal style of the welfare state.452 As the
1950s wore on, these critiques were largely understood to
have been absorbed—lessons learned, it had been time to
move on—thus triggering the occasional label of the “postrealist” generation of legal process scholarship.453 In the
1960s and 1970s, however, this dominant approach was
gradually joined by a two-pronged resurrection. On the one
hand was a revival of classic liberal pictures about the
efficacy of the free market.454 On the other, American legal
academia experienced the emergence of a second wave of
critique focused on those background rules constituting the
classic and modern images of the market-state relation.455
Duncan Kennedy is emblematic.456
451. Id. at 591.
452. THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 174, at 210.
453. Id.
454. See supra Part I.C.
455. There is a large critical literature on the political economy of the last
third of the twentieth century. A few examples include: RICHARD S. MARKOVITS,
TRUTH OR ECONOMICS: ON THE DEFINITION, PREDICTION, AND RELEVANCE OF
ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY (2008); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); UNGER, supra note 175; STEVEN K. VOGEL,
FREER MARKETS, MORE RULES: REGULATORY REFORM IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL
COUNTRIES (1996); Richard Abel, Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 9, at
326; C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. &
PUB. AFFAIRS 3 (1975); Morton J. Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation,
in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 9, at 360; Mark Kelman, Consumption
Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 669 (1979); Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and
Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980); Duncan Kennedy,
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special
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In The Role of Law in Economic Thought, Kennedy
rehearsed some of Hale and Cohen‟s points, but elaborated
it them in a new way: the economics of both laissez faire, as
well as the welfare school, both depended in a constitutive
way on the work of a relatively autonomous “legal
consciousness.”457 Kennedy began with the classical problem
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV.
563 (1982); Gary Minda, The Dilemmas of Property and Sovereignty in the
Postmodern Era: The Regulatory Takings Problem, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 599
(1991); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661
(1989).
456. Many of Kennedy‟s works were seminal in the Critical Legal Studies
Movement, including: Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687 (1976) (“My purpose is to examine
the relationship between . . . the „erosion of the rigid rules of the late nineteenth
century theory of contractual obligation‟ and the „socialization of our theory of
contract[.]” (emphasis omitted)); Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic
Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939 (1985)
[hereinafter Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought] (discussing, in
four essays, how nineteenth century economic thought “managed to maintain
the illusion of coherence”); Kennedy, supra note 1, at 209 (“Introduc[ing] the
reader to a method for understanding the political significance of legal thinking,
a method that might be called structuralist or phenomenological, or neoMarxist, or all three together.”). Many will no doubt expect Duncan Kennedy‟s
work to be most obviously connected with what came to be known as “the
indeterminacy thesis.” See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 1, at 362 n.56. While
indeterminacy and contradiction are certainly relevant to the critical image I
am constructing, insofar as critics showed how ideas like liberty, property, and
contract suffered from an abuse of deductive reasoning at the hands of the
classics, the focus here is on the public-private distinction and its association
with political economy.
457. Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought, supra note 456, at 993.
Duncan Kennedy has described relative autonomy, or “circular causation,” as a
situation where “a small change in one factor initiates a small change in
another factor, which „feeds back‟ or reinforces the first change. This initiates a
second change in the second factor, another reaction back, and so forth, until the
system restabilizes at a new level that is much further from the starting point
than would seem plausible if we looked at the first small change in isolation.”
KENNEDY, supra note 391, at 92. The debate on the autonomy of legal systems,
as I have suggested in the movement from Marx to Hale to Kennedy, has a long
pedigree. After Marx, a serious effort to understand the social nature of law was
attempted by Max Weber, who believed that a unique quality of classic
liberalism was its ability to develop a legal mode of thought that was
autonomous from other forms of social thought. MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 641-44 (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., 1968). The autonomy of the legal system served economic
needs, since autonomy brought with it a sense of predictability. Id. at 655. Legal
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of how to show, on the one hand, that government was
compatible with natural freedom (what Locke had set out to
do), and on the other hand, that they needed to identify
certain principles that would be able to reliably distinguish
“good government” from the bad.458 In this vein, classic
economists needed an argument about the inherent justness
of property and contract, so that the attendant distributions
of wealth could consequently be justified.459 The fact was,
however, that writers in the classic style never produced
any legal theory at all, and were content instead to label
property and contract as “sacred” and “natural” as a matter
of definition.460 Whatever these terms might mean in
practice, that meaning would be deduced through the power
of natural reason.461 This idea, as we have seen, was opened
up by writers like Hale and Cohen, who attacked the idea
that there was anything neutral or natural about those
terms, but that instead they were highly political and
coercive.462 As Kennedy reinforced: “It is therefore simply
nonsensical to claim that property and contract in the
abstract define a regime that is free and just. Before we can
even begin to assess such a statement, we have to know
what property and what contract.”463 Writers in the classic
style failed to ask these questions, paving the way for those
who would.
Kennedy suggested that a fundamental reason why this
failure was obscured was the emergence of a dominant
subsystem464 within late nineteenth century legal
autonomy also served political needs, as Locke had also argued: in order for
government to be legitimate, executive and judicial authority needed to exist
independently of individual caprice. Id. at 652-53.
458. Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought, supra note 456, at 949.
459. Id. at 949-50.
460. Id. at 950.
461. See id.
462. See supra Part II.B.
463. Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought, supra note 456, at 952.
464. Borrowing from Structuralist works like Claude Levi-Strauss‟ The Savage
Mind and Jean Piaget‟s Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood, Kennedy
explained that his idea of “subsystem” utilized “a small set of conceptual
building blocks, along with a small set of typical arguments about as to how the
concepts should be applied, to produce results that seem to the jurists involved
to have a high level of coherence across within and across legal fields.” DUNCAN
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consciousness.465 Calling the subsystem “classical legal
thought,” Kennedy argued that the classic liberal tendency
to assume the naturalness of property and contract was
made possible through the judicial embrace of a Lockean
theory of property, along with an idea that the value of a
product was a function of the labor that had gone into it.466
Simultaneously, classical jurists developed the notion of
freedom of contract,467 to which we have seen Morris Cohen‟s
response.468 In both cases, classical legal thought worked out
a sharp distinction between public and private law, and the
image of government power as belonging to the former and

KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL
Books 2006).

OF

CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, at xiv-xv (Beard

465. Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought, supra note 456, at 952.
Orly Lobel has explained that there are two contemporaneous tracks in the use
of the term “legal consciousness.” Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal
Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 937, 939 n.1 (2007). The first is the one being used here, as developed by
Duncan Kennedy. Id. In the other, “sociolegal researchers have drawn on
empirical data to explore the evaluation of legality made by ordinary citizens in
everyday life.” Id.; see also PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON
PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 45-49 (1998) (discussing different
forms of legal consciousness); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND
GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 62
(1990) (describing legal consciousness as arising from one‟s life experiences);
Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes
of Ordinary Citizens About Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW & SOC‟Y REV.
1055, 1058-59 (2000) (describing the study of legal consciousness as a means of
exploring the ways people do and do not think about the law). As Lobel states:
Legal consciousness research in this second stream is described as the
examination of:
the role of law (broadly conceived) and its role in constructing
understandings, affecting actions, and shaping various aspects
of social life. It centers on the study of individuals‟ experiences
with law and legal norms, decisions about legal compliance,
and a detailed exploration of the subtle ways in which law
affects the everyday lives of individuals to articulate the
various understandings of law/legality that people have and
use to construct their understanding of their world.
Lobel, supra, at 937 n.1 (quoting Nielsen, supra, at 1059).
466. Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought, supra note 456, at 953.
467. Id.
468. See supra notes 395-97 and accompanying text.
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never the latter.469 In terms of how this belief system
assisted classical economists by providing a working theory:
The classical legal thinkers provided crucial support for the labor
theory of value by showing that the idea of respect for the labor of
others could, all by itself, generate through the process of legal
reasoning a vast, detailed code of particular rules about what . . .
constituted an actionable injury to property. They provided crucial
support for the theory of free exchange by showing that the
abstract notion of freedom could generate, also by the strictly
rational processes of the law, an equally complex code of rules of
470
contract, agency, corporations, and so forth.

The deductive aspect of classical legal thought was
essential to arguing that ongoing state efforts in support of
property and contract institutions were natural and not
coercive.471 If as a starting point it was believed that
property and contract were sacred, and that it was possible
to derive from those starting points entire systems of
common law rules, then those elaborated systems could
partake of that same sacred quality.472 Conversely, if state
action could not be reeled back towards a will theory and
tacit consent, a court would be on solid ground in
proclaiming state action to be coercive, and more
importantly, necessarily reducing incentives to labor, and
then wealth.473
Tying a nice ribbon on it, classical legal thought
imagined constitutional law as the enforcing mechanism.
On the one hand, sovereign powers would come explicitly
into the hands of an individual claimant when he bore an
action against an organ of the state interfering with his will.
On the other, as Cohen and Hale argued, sovereign powers
also came into the hands of an individual any time another
private party interfered with his will, though in these cases
the power of the state would be channeled through property,
contract, and tort law.474 It was constitutional interpretation
469. Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought, supra note 456, at 95354.
470. Id. at 955.
471. Id. at 956.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 956-57.
474. See supra Part II.B.
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that managed this dual track, along with what Kennedy
called the “capstone of the classical edifice.”475
In his characterization of a “legal consciousness” which
supported the classic liberal style of viewing law as an
important, though entirely passive component of political
economy,476 Kennedy provided a more comprehensive style
of critique than was available in the writings of Hale and
Cohen. Whereas these earlier writers showed how the
liberal versions of property and contract law had
distributive consequences, they never offered an account
that attempted to analyze the structure of the law in a way
that would suggest that these coercive restrictions were
attributable to something deeper than the mere sway of
political power.477 In The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal
Thought, Kennedy explained that his use of “consciousness”
was an attempt to pry from the hands of modern liberal
historiographers the idea that “conservative politics” had
been the real and only source of laissez-faire
jurisprudence.478 This view ignored the possibility that it
was the structure of legal argument itself, with “a set of
concepts and intellectual operations that evolves according
to a pattern of its own, and exercises an influence on results
distinguishable from those of political power and economic
interest.”479 Or, as David Trubek put it, a critique of legal
consciousness provides the corrective to the cynical error
which understands “legal order as merely a mask behind
which the rich and powerful hide their continued
domination and exploitation of the poor and powerless.”480
These social forces were undeniably important, to be sure,
but any attempt to understand the constitutive role of law
in economic thought would fail if it ignored the mediating
475. Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought, supra note 456, at 95758.
476. Id. at 957.
477. See Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics
of Collapse), 95 IOWA L. REV. 195, 204 (2009) (“[T]he legal realists generally tried
to crack legal formalism at certain weak points rather than theorizing it from
some overarching standpoint.”).
478. KENNEDY, supra note 464, at 1-2.
479. Id. at 2.
480. David M. Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order:
Balbus and the Challenge of Critical Social Thought About Law, 11 LAW & SOC‟Y
REV. 529, 544 (1977).
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effects of legal consciousness.481 Nevertheless, Kennedy
needed to thread the needle, admitting that though legal
consciousness must be autonomous, that autonomy could
never be anything more than relative.482 At the end of the
day, “[l]egal institutions and ideas have a dynamic, or
dialectical, or constitutive relationship to economic
activity.”483
In addition the notion of classical legal thought as a
form of legal consciousness, a second advance was the
adaptation of the critique to neoclassical microeconomics,
and the argument that while modern economists had
distanced themselves from a great number of classic
positions, they remained tied to a similar image of
background legal rules.484 In particular, Kennedy saw this
shared misunderstanding in two ways. First, the
neoclassical notion of perfect competition, predicated on free
exchange, indulges in the same old idea that there is one
specific set of legal arrangements corresponding to an idea
of “freedom” in the marketplace.485 This assumption, again,
ignores the indeterminacy of property and contract. But the
persistence of this assumption generates the second
misunderstanding, also of apiece with its classic ancestor.
The assumption that a determinate legal background exists,
and that this background, as distilled through the common
law, represents the efficient allocation of resources in the
free market, presents us again with the dichotomy between
the sphere of private enterprise and the opposing sphere of
481. KENNEDY, supra note 464, at 2. The idea of mediation has been an
important element in explaining how it is that most jurists tend to be at ease in
the face of repeated contradiction and incoherence. Roberto Unger has explained
that the dominant form of legal analysis:
[W]orks by putting a good face—indeed the best possible face—on as
much of law as it can, and therefore also on the institutional
arrangements that take in law their detailed and distinctive form. It
must restrict anomaly, for what cannot be reconciled with the schemes
of policy and principle must eventually be rejected as mistaken.
UNGER, supra note 175, at 40.
482. KENNEDY, supra note 464, at 4.
483. Id. at 2; see also Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal
Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL, supra note 293, at 19, 19.
484. Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought, supra note 456, at 960.
485. Id. at 964-65.
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government regulation.486 Unlike the classical economists,
those performing in the modern liberal style will refrain
from saying where, as a matter of principle, the appropriate
line between the market and the state should lie. But as
Kennedy explains: “The apologetic effect comes from the
framing of the issue, rather than through the kind of claim
to ethical closure that was typical of the Classics. Yet the
effect may be more powerful for having shed its too
obviously contestable pretensions.”487
Summing up this little tour of some of critical theory‟s
biggest hits, the discussion began with Marx‟s classic
critique of the liberal distinction between a naturalized civil
society and an artificial political society. While admitting
the progressive nature of this distinction, Marx argued that
the result was a deeply constrained and dehumanizing way
to think about human freedom. In the liberal conception,
Marx explained, we are told that we are free only when we
are alone, and told we are a part of a community only when
it really doesn‟t matter. To be truly free, to be truly human,
Marx concluded, we need to recognize that our humanity is
only realizable through community, and not in opposition to
it. What legal realism brought, here in the context of some
of Hale and Cohen‟s work, was a close look at the role of law
in the construction of the naturalized civil society that Marx
was criticizing. As Hale, Cohen, and others made clear, the
liberal distinction between market freedom and government
control was an illusion. Looking carefully at property and
contract regimes operating in the early decades of twentieth
century American legal thought, these writers showed how
property and contract—the legal foundations of liberal
markets—were coercive and distributive, and not neutral
and “free.” Pushing the critique further, the discussion
moved to Duncan Kennedy and the work of the critical legal
studies movement. Not only was the distinction between
market and state dehumanizing (Marx) and illusory (Cohen
and Hale), it was also structured by a form of legal
consciousness. As a consequence, the attack on liberal
legalism would require more than an acquaintance with the
“politics of law”—it would also need to master the “law of
politics.”
486. Id. at 963.
487. Id. at 964.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has presented snapshot illustrations of the
dominant images of political economy in liberal political
theory. Central to each of these images is an idea about
human freedom made possible in a competitive
marketplace, offset against an idea about governmental
control and political power. As we have seen in the work of
John Locke, human beings are natural rights-bearers, and
the purpose of the state is to protect and promote those
rights. Freedom is understood here as the very absence of
coercion. Similarly, Friedrich Hayek taught that
individualism is the highest of all goods, and that its
greatest enemy is the interventionist state and its tendency
to control the competitive process. Even for those liberals
less worried about the road to fascism, whether they were
Henry Carter Adams, Frank Knight, or John Maynard
Keynes, the star of freedom was still viewed through the
lens of control. These liberals simply believed freedom to
work differently than the other liberals (whether old or
new)—and not that freedom was coerced, or that
competition could only be realized through control.
Of course, the liberal vision of a natural society carved
away from political society has been a subject of criticism
since the beginnings of classical social theory. By the time
Duncan Kennedy made his assertion about liberalism‟s
fundamental contradiction in the 1970s, it wasn‟t startling
because it was new. It was startling because it was total.
Was the contradiction really everywhere in such a
structure? Is that really the way knowledge and power were
deployed throughout the legal system? As it inched towards
becoming a cliché, the notion that all law was in the shadow
of a liberal contradiction diminished.
A generation later, this basic insight should be revisited
not only for its analytical grace but also for its practical
power. Consider the state of the game in the second decade
of the twenty-first century. A few years out from the
recession of 2008, and with the possibility of a “double-dip”
still very real, there‟s no end to the back and forth missives
between modern liberals and classic/neoliberals. What
seems guaranteed is that the conversation will continue to
be framed in terms of naturally occurring competitive
markets, and the greater or lesser degree to which the state
should intervene in those markets. The discourse is
interminable, and for good reason.
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As Bernard Harcourt has recently argued, and as laid
out in the work of Marx, Cohen, Hale, and Kennedy, free
markets are illusions.488 At least in the context of liberal
theory, the concept of free competition is a concept requiring
an extensive amount of background and foreground rules.
Without these rules, the concept just couldn‟t exist. As a
consequence, it is literally illusory to think that we are
dealing with a choice between a pre-political space that is
off-limits, and a coercive political state. Social life is both
constituted and managed through law, at least in the world
of liberalism. Hence the contradiction: liberal freedom is
liberal control.
But here‟s where the pay-off comes in, a pay-off yet to be
cashed. There‟s no need to see this contradiction—the
illusion of the free market—as an unavoidable and total
social condition. Instead, we can see liberal legalism as
merely a set of styles, techniques, or approaches to the
canvass of social life.489 The critique of liberal legalism
488. HARCOURT, supra note 15, at 44 (“The categories of „free market‟ and
„regulated,‟ it turns out, hinder rather than help. They are, in effect, illusory and
distort rather than advance our knowledge.”).
489. In this context, some writers have looked for help in Immanuel Kant‟s
theory of aesthetic judgments. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF
JUDGMENT (Paul Gruyer ed., Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews trans., 2000) (1790).
There is a sizable literature on Kant‟s theory of aesthetic judgments. See, e.g.,
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT (Paul Guyer ed., 1992); HANNAH ARENDT,
LECTURES ON KANT‟S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Ronald Beiner ed., 1982). For Kant,
there are two ways to think about the universal judgments we make about the
goodness of any given thing. First is the “objectively universal” judgment, which
is valid for all human beings due to the rightness of a particular concept. KANT,
supra, at 100. This kind of judgment is therefore logical. In opposition to this
form of reflection is what Kant called the “subjectively universal” judgment. Id.
This sort of judgment is not based on the objective validity of a concept, but is
instead generated by the subjective perception of an object. See id. The
universality of this second kind of judgment therefore emerges out of our
subjective perceptions, as opposed to being connected up with an objectively
valid first principle. Say that I look at a painting, and as I try to understand it
and imagine it, I either determine that it is “good” or not. This determination of
the painting‟s worth, according to Kant, is just as different from (1) saying that
a meal is “good” as it is from (2) saying that it is “good” to tell the truth. A
determination that a painting is good lies somewhere between these two—if I
say that a meal is good, I am not likely to be claiming that it will be perceived as
good for all people, and if I say that it is good to tell the truth, I am likely to be
claiming that this is good for all people. That is, the former judgment is entirely
subjective (the meal is good, to me), and the latter judgment is entirely objective
because it is based on the universal validity of a logical concept. For Kant, the
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assists us in the effort to get some distance from the idea
that there must be two basic models of market society in the
world—to see the difference between the style with which
we approach the canvass, and the canvass itself. After
having seen that markets are indeterminate, it also enables
us in the exercise of our weakened powers of institutional
imagination. It is in the service of Roberto Unger‟s plea that
we come to understand the versions of market society we
have seen in the past two centuries as only illustrations,
and not as the actual exhaustion of what market societies
might ever become, that this critique should be revitalized
today.490
As a way of getting a feel for this, imagine for a moment
that you are an attorney in Washington, D.C., and after
lunch decide to take a quick stroll through the National
Gallery of Art. Passing along, you notice Grant Wood‟s 1936
oil painting Haying, and are struck by its curious portrayal
of a farm.491 Quite obviously managed by human hands, the
farmer is away, as if plucked by aliens. Later, after a
meeting at the Federal Trade Commission, you take
measure of Michael Lantz‟s 1942 sculpture, Man
Controlling Trade, which you‟ve passed a dozen times
before.492 Like the painting, this work also depicts a human
connection with nature, though in a very different setting,
with very different effects. Here, man is powerful and
aggressive, locked in struggle, though in comparison with
the might of the horse, likely to lose. This image also strikes
aesthetic judgment about a painting sits in the middle of these totally subjective
and objective forms of judgment. It is subjective, for sure, but the judgment also
aspires to universalism. Why? “When we call something beautiful, the pleasure
that we feel is expected of everyone else in the judgment of taste as
necessary . . . .” Id. at 103 (emphasis added). Or in other words, while we know
that we cannot be objectively right in our view that this is a good painting, we
want it to be accepted universally because we suspect that everybody should
likely have the same cognitive process that we do. But we also know that they
do not, and so Kant called aesthetic judgments “subjectively universal.”
490. See, e.g., UNGER, FREE TRADE REIMAGINED, supra note 16, at 16.
491. Grant Wood, Haying (1936) (National Gallery of Art). For an image of
Haying, see HAY IN ART, http://www.hayinart.com/images/2304.jpg (last visited
Mar. 3, 2012).
492. Michael Lantz, Man Controlling Trade (1942) (Smithsonian American Art
Institution). For an image of Man Controlling Trade, see The Federal Trade
Commission Headquarters, FED. TRADE COMM‟N, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/hq_
building.shtm (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
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you as beautiful, though in a far more visceral way than
with Wood‟s eerie presentation of the farmer-less farm. On
your way home from work, you walk up Fourteenth Street,
pass the The Black Cat, and notice My Bloody Valentine‟s
famous “wall of sound” blaring out of the venue‟s
speakers.493 You‟ve heard it before, but at this moment,
you‟re struck by the incredibly loud warp of the guitars, and
the oddly “unified” confluence of all the dissonance. Walking
through the door of your home, you wonder what it might
have been like if you had been a painter or musician,
instead of the legal technician you apparently became.
Perhaps you tell yourself that your work is your art, and
perhaps you‟re convinced.
But probably not. We tend to think that there is
something objective about law that art can bypass or maybe
even avoid entirely. As many working lawyers understand,
however, this ostensible objectivity doesn‟t actually turn out
to be very reliable or determinate. If objectivity doesn‟t
separate law from art, perhaps the difference turns instead
on the apparently incomparable sorts of stakes involved in
legal disputes and artistic disagreements? This distinction,
after all, can hardly be contested. With this in mind, we
should ask again: should the fact that legal disputes and
artistic disagreements yield very different kinds of
consequences keep us from analogizing legal styles from
styles of art?494 Maybe, but consider the impression of the
following parallels.

493. MY BLOODY VALENTINE, LOVELESS (Creation Records 1989).
494. Pierre Schlag has described the sometimes perilous decision to view law
in aesthetic terms in the following way:
Many thinkers view aesthetic judgments as subjective and ungrounded,
impervious to rational argument. Meanwhile, law is written “in a field
of pain and death.” To suggest then that law is an aesthetic enterprise
can easily seem cavalier, ethically obtuse, even cruel. We are confronted
with the disturbing possibility that law paints its order of pain and
death on human beings with no more ethical warrant or rational
grounding than an artist who applies paint to canvas.
I do not dispute—in fact, I would affirm—these ethical concerns and
moral judgments here. But the notion of aesthetics I wish to invoke is
neither confined to the realm of art nor preoccupied with questions of
beauty.
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Wood‟s suggestive portrayal of the farmer-less farm
feels familiar. In Haying, nature is in the foreground—
indeed, the natural world is what this painting appears to
be completely about. And yet, the strange forms of hay, the
jug, the wheelbarrow, the farmhouse itself, all clue us in to
the fact that in order for this farm to succeed, and to
understand the nature of the farm as it really is, we must
know the work of the human hand. Man is clearly in this
painting, and yet he is nowhere. Perhaps we can say this is
an image in the classic liberal style.
In Man Controlling Trade, the impressive struggle of a
highly “interventionist” wrangler attempts to wrestle into
control a wild animal. It is in no way clear from the image
whether the man will succeed in his effort to tame the
horse, or even that he doing it in the right way. We don‟t
Pierre Schlag, Commentary, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1047, 1050 (2002) (footnotes omitted). As for the idea that art has its own
political stakes, the idea is an old one:
There are two „positions on objectivity‟ which are constantly at war with
one another, even when intellectual life falsely presents them as at
peace. A work of art that is committed strips the magic from a work of
art that is content to be a fetish, an idle pastime for those who would
like to sleep through the deluge that threatens them, in an apoliticism
that is in fact deeply political. For the committed, such works are a
distraction from the battle of real interests, in which no one is any
longer exempt from the conflict between the two great blocs. The
possibility of intellectual life itself depends on this conflict to such an
extent that only blind illusion can insist on rights that may be
shattered tomorrow. For autonomous works of art, however, such
considerations, and the conception of art which underlies them, are
themselves the spiritual catastrophe of which the committed keep
warning. Once the life of the mind renounces the duty and liberty of its
own pure objectification, it has abdicated. Thereafter, works of art
merely assimilate themselves to the brute existence against which they
protest, in forms so ephemeral . . . that from their first day they belong
to the seminars in which they inevitably end. The menacing thrust of
the antithesis is a reminder of how precarious the position of art is
today.
Theodor Adorno, Commitment, in AESTHETIC AND POLITICS 177, 177-78 (Ronald
Taylor trans., 2002); see also ROLAND BARTHES, The Photographic Message, in
IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT 15, 19-20 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977) (1977) (“[W]hen one
wants to be „neutral‟, „objective‟, one strives to copy reality meticulously, as
though the analogical were a factor of resistance against the investment of
values (such at least is the definition of aesthetic „realism‟); how then can the
photography be at once „objective‟ and „invested‟, natural and cultural?”).
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even know for sure that he shouldn‟t just let the animal
alone. What we do know, however, is that man‟s
relationship with his opponent is present, active, and alive.
Unlike in Wood‟s painting, where we can see solitary man‟s
passive footprint while the farmer himself is secreted away,
in this sculpture we find a strong and capable human being,
representing a willful society, exercising control over the
world. This image, quite intentionally, is in the modern
liberal style.
As for a musical rendering of the critical style, My
Bloody Valentine‟s “wall of sound” seems as good as
anything. Unlike the two prior works dealing with man and
nature, here there is a conspicuous lack of anything meant
to reflect the “natural” world. In its place is a pulsing force
of fuzz and static—the technical connection between guitar
strings and amplifiers. Further, this image is almost
dedifferentiated,495 as the sounds have become so entangled
through the distortion that whatever independent sources
may have at once existed, they now come through as
something resembling an integrated roar. Also analogically
useful is the similar way in which My Bloody Valentine and
some types of critique relate to taste: it would seem that for
many, it‟s something that you just find appealing, or you
don‟t.
So how does any of this help in advancing the kinds of
stale conversations we see re-played in the course of our
495. Pierre Schlag has moved the critical style in a direction which is in a kind
of combative dialogue with the work of Hale, Cohen, and Kennedy: though the
early move to show how law constituted the market was surely correct, it was
misleading in that it failed to realize that the market just as equally made the
law. Even after we grant the complexity of a “relatively autonomous” legal
consciousness, Schlag argues that its purported distinctions between law and
economics simply cannot stand in light of what he calls the dedifferentiation
problem. Schlag‟s analysis of the dedifferentiation problem does take account of
Luhmann, but only in a footnote:
The great thinker of differentiation in social systems is Niklas
Luhmann. Oddly, however, his thinking has limited relevance here.
The reason is simple: Luhmann writes from a perspective that assumes
the cogency of differentiation in his own thinking. He presumes the
perspicuousness and relevance of his own differentiations. And
accordingly, he bypasses the intellectual problem raised here.
Pierre Schlag, The Dedifferentiation Problem, 42 CONT. PHILOS. REV. 35, 37 n.7
(2009).
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public life? How might the art analogy open the way to a
reinvigorated institutional imagination?
One possible answer may lie in the condition of
contemporary legal analysis. In some versions of the story,
prior generations of jurists experienced stretches of time in
which particular approaches to legal reasoning were
dominated by certain sets of ideas and practices. At one
moment, there was believed to be a consensus not only
about formalist techniques for resolving legal questions, but
also about larger background questions regarding the
natural and necessary content of the private law in
conjunction with an artificial and synthetic public law
apparatus. Whether or not these beliefs were consistently
played out at the time is one matter—but the fact of a
perceived consensus is another, a consensus about these
ideas being right. A later generation experienced the
degradation of these ideas, and the ascension of
functionalist techniques for resolving legal questions, and a
widely held belief that the private law was appropriately
subject to public manipulation. At this time, these ideas
were believed to be right.
Today, there seems little evidence that there might be
consensus about the right kinds of legal techniques, or
about the right kind of balance between the public and the
private. Even more, the enormous influence of American
pragmatism appears to have produced a situation in which
it is unusual for even so-called “conservatives” and “liberals”
to consistently favor any given approach. The typical stand
is instead to pick and choose, eclectically serving as classic
at one moment, modern at another, formalist in one
instance, functional in the next. The eclectic pragmatist can
even deploy the critical style if she finds that it will be
pragmatic to do so.496
The upshot is a condition in which there is a widespread
lack of faith regarding the intrinsic truth of any given style
of legal analysis—only a faith that there is something
valuable about pragmatism. In this terrain, the old and
repetitive conversations about more or less government feel
especially unhelpful. Most of us know, nowadays, that in a
conversation about the value of the free market, it is
entirely acceptable to emphasize the problem of market
496. Desautels-Stein, supra note 12, at 590-94.
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failure at one moment and government failure at the next.
Context is what matters, not ideology.
In a way, what the coming of pragmatism has done is
shed light on the idea that thinking about law as art is
perhaps ineluctable. That is, it is not that we might have
something to gain by choosing to borrow a new vocabulary,
but that law and art have always been intertwined—there‟s
no choosing about it, just whether we want to keep
pretending or not. But whether we like our pragmatism
light or heavy—by disclosing the fact of our collective loss of
faith in any single perspective on the market-state
antagonism (i.e., the “light” version), or by suggesting that
law was already art (i.e., the “heavy” version)—why not
take the next step? Why not view liberal legalism as an
aesthetic approach to political economy? Why not open the
conversation up to the notion that “free markets” are and
have always been legal concepts? Why not now?

